

## Victim Resources FAQ

- ▶ What happens after conviction, but before sentencing?
- ▶ What is a presentence report?
- ▶ What happens after sentencing?
- ▶ Is there a comprehensive handbook for Alaska crime victims?
- ▶ What is a victim impact statement?
- ▶ How do I get notification of an offender's release?
- ▶ What should I do if I receive unwanted contact from the offender?
- ▶ How do I update my address if I move?
- ▶ How do I contact the DOC Victim Service Unit?
- ▶ Who should I contact about problems with restitution?
- ▶ What is Probation?
- ▶ What is Parole?

**Parole lets the offender serve the last part of a sentence in the community** supervised by a parole officer. Rather than releasing inmates without controls, parole provides the gradual reintegration on the offender into the community, subject to conditions set by the Parole Board. There are two types of parole: discretionary parole and mandatory parole. (Parole descriptions are from the Handbook for Victims of Crime in Alaska published by the Alaska Judicial Council.)

- ▶ What is Discretionary Parole?
- ▶ What is Mandatory Parole?
- ▶ What is the difference in Alaska between a probation officer and a parole officer?
- ▶ How long can a felony offender be on probation in Alaska?

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## Of Interest

- Victim's P&P
- Resources for Crime Victims
- Frequently Asked Questions
- Toll-Free Number for Victim/Witness Assistance
- DOC Victim Notification Program
- Automated Victim Notification System (VINE)
- Victim Impact Statements
- Offender Photograph Request Form

## Quick Links

- Probation and Parole Home
- Victim Services
- Interstate Probation/Parole
- Sex Offender Monitoring
- VPSO Program

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**PENNSYLVANIA**  
**DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS**



**RECIDIVISM REPORT**  
**2013**

**Tom Corbett**  
**Governor**

**John E. Wetzel**  
**Secretary**

# RECIDIVISM REPORT



2 0 1 3

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## PRS Overview

The Bureau of Planning, Research and Statistics (PRS) directs the maintenance of historical data records for the Department and conducts ongoing planning, research, and evaluation activities designed to provide key decision-makers with quantitative data analysis for use in formulating and evaluating departmental policies and practices. Specific functions performed by the Office include planning, program evaluation, corrections research, data analysis, statistical repository, policy development and analysis.

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**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA**  
**DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS**

February 8, 2013

I am pleased to present the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' 2013 Recidivism Report, which we believe to be a landmark state recidivism study. This groundbreaking and comprehensive study represents the keystone of the Corbett Corrections Reform initiative, establishing a **“new normal”** in our criminal justice system by focusing on reducing crime. This report was produced by staff from the department's Bureau of Planning, Research, and Statistics. They are to be commended for their work on this comprehensive report. The scope of this report is impressive, and sets the bar high for future analysis of state recidivism rates.

The report presents a mixed picture of recidivism rates in Pennsylvania. While on the one hand reincarceration rates are going down, rearrest rates have been flat or slightly rising. For the most part, recidivism rates have remained virtually unchanged over at least the past decade in Pennsylvania. While this is disappointing, it also presents an opportunity. Over the past year, under the leadership of Governor Corbett, fundamental transformations to Pennsylvania's criminal justice system have been enacted into law as a part of the administration's Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI). In the Corbett Corrections Reform initiative, population and cost, although both remain essential measurements, will not be the sole numbers. The **“new normal”** is to expect and require quantifiable results. Citizens of the Commonwealth should have every expectation of a corrections system that actually helps people correct themselves; one that is based on research, not on anecdotal stories and innuendo. Changes resulting from JRI are expected to significantly improve public safety, reduce recidivism, and lower correctional costs for the citizens of the Commonwealth in the years to come. I view this report as the first step towards measuring our progress in reaching these goals. Make no mistake; crime reduction will always be the benchmark for performance measurement when we talk about recidivism reduction efforts. As such, this report is our baseline for going forward.

The details of this report are worth exploring. Some truly innovative measures of recidivism are provided, such as the fraction of total arrests in Pennsylvania that are attributable to ex-offenders released from state prison, an analysis of the degree to which ex-offenders specialize in certain crime types when they reoffend, and an analysis of recidivism rates by geographic location. A section is also included which provides estimates of the potential cost savings for various recidivism reduction scenarios.

Continued...

A special section of this report also examines recidivism rates for our Community Corrections Center (CCC) system. This section is really an update to a previous analysis of the CCC system provided in a study conducted by Dr. Edward Latessa at the University of Cincinnati in 2009. The findings here are largely consistent with Dr. Latessa's previous findings. We know from this updated analysis that we have a lot of work to do to improve outcomes in our CCC system. Fortunately, many of the legislative changes accomplished through JRI are specifically targeted towards improving the CCC system. Again, this report sets the baseline for going forward, as we focus our CCC system around performance-based recidivism reduction outcomes.

At the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections we believe that one of the most fundamental methods for accomplishing our goals of less crime, less prison population, and less taxpayer costs, is to utilize timely, accurate, and reliable data to guide policy. A scientific, data-driven approach offers similar benefits to the field of corrections as it does to other fields of practice such as medicine, for improving lives and saving money. I believe we also have an obligation to provide data and evaluation in a public and transparent manner. This report reflects such an approach.

The report also benefited tremendously from our partnership with Dr. Kiminori Nakamura, a professor in the Criminology & Criminal Justice department at the University of Maryland. Dr. Nakamura was a co-author on this report, and also served as a technical advisor. We have been working with Dr. Nakamura over the past year, under a researcher-practitioner partnership grant through the National Institute of Justice. Under this grant, Dr. Nakamura is on loan from his university on a part-time basis, as an "embedded criminologist" in our department. He serves as a partner and a general scientific advisor, not just with this study but with all of our research efforts. I thank him for his role in this report.

We trust that you find this report useful and informative. We also hope that this report will generate some significant discussions surrounding the implications of its findings for recidivism reduction policy.

Lastly, I want to thank the entire staff at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, for their ongoing work and dedication towards improving the safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Sincerely,



John E. Wetzel

Secretary of Corrections

JEW/KBB/dls

# 2013 RECIDIVISM IN PENNSYLVANIA

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# RECIDIVISM IN PENNSYLVANIA

## INTRODUCTION

One in 200 adult Pennsylvanians is currently incarcerated in a Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution. Ninety percent of the inmates currently in a Pennsylvania state prison will eventually be released. According to findings in this report, a large proportion of those released will return to some sort of offending behavior. This report presents recidivism statistics for offenders released from the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Recidivism is measured by three different methods in this report: rearrest, reincarceration, and overall recidivism (see box below for a description of each measure).

### RECIDIVISM DEFINED:

**Rearrest** is measured as the first instance of arrest after inmates are released from state prison.

**Reincarceration** is measured as the first instance of returning to state prison after inmates are released from state prison.

**Overall Recidivism** is measured as the first instance of any type of rearrest or reincarceration after inmates are released from state prison.

### HIGHLIGHTS:

- Approximately 6 in 10 released inmates recidivate (are rearrested or reincarcerated) within three years of release from prison.
- Overall recidivism rates have been stable over the last ten years.
- Rearrest rates have been slowly increasing over the last ten years.
- Reincarceration rates peaked around 2005 and began to decline in the most recent years.
- Despite a drop starting in 2005, reincarceration rates were slightly higher in the most recent years than they were in 1990.
- Offenders returning to urban areas are more likely to be rearrested, however those returning to rural areas are more likely to be reincarcerated.
- Dauphin County reports the highest overall recidivism rates.
- Released inmates do not appear to heavily specialize in the same crime type when they reoffend. The most specialized type of recidivist is the property offender. The least specialized type of recidivist is the violent offender.
- Released inmates are more likely to be reincarcerated (mostly for technical parole violations) than rearrested during the first 18 months after release from prison, and thereafter are significantly more likely to be rearrested.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## HIGHLIGHTS (Continued):

- More than half of those who return to prison within three years after release will do so within the first year of release. The first year is by far the most risky period for recidivism.
- Younger released inmates are more likely to recidivate than older inmates. A released inmate who is under 21 at the time of release from prison is more than twice as likely to recidivate within three years than a released inmate who is over age 50 at the time of release from prison.
- Those with prior prison stays are more likely to recidivate than those who have never been in state prison. A released inmate who has already served one or more times in a state prison has around a 25 percentage point higher recidivism rate than one who is released from state prison for the first time.
- Those with more prior arrests are more likely to recidivate than those with fewer prior arrests. A released inmate who has 10 or more prior arrests is greater than 6 times more likely to recidivate than a released inmate who has no prior arrest history other than the arrest for the current incarceration.
- Property offenders are significantly more likely to recidivate than other types of offenders.
- DUI, rape, and arson offenders have the lowest recidivism rates. While the 3-year overall recidivism rate for all offenders is 59.9%, the overall rate for DUI is 38.4%, for rape is 49.3%, and for arson is 46.3%. The highest overall recidivism rates are for stolen property (79.6%), burglary (72.5%), and kidnapping (73.2%).
- Nearly three-fourths of the rearrest offenses committed by released inmates within three years after their release from prison are for less serious (Part II) offenses. Half (51%) are for a drug or property offense. Only 17% of all rearrests are for violent offenses (1.3% for murder).
- Approximately 10% of all arrests in Pennsylvania during 2010 were arrests involving released inmates who had previously (in the last 10 years) served time in state prison.
- Per capita arrest rates for violent crimes are 14 times higher among released inmates than among the general public.
- Inmates who are released under parole supervision are more likely to be reincarcerated, however, less likely to be rearrested for a new offense than their counterparts who complete their maximum sentence (max outs).
- Nearly two-thirds of all reincarcerations within three years of release from prison are for technical parole violations.
- Those released inmates who are paroled after failing parole at least once in the past have a recidivism rate of about 12 percentage points higher than those who are released onto parole for the first time.
- PA DOC can save approximately \$44.7 million annually by reducing its 1-year reincarceration rate by 10 percentage points.
- PA DOC can save approximately \$16.5 million annually by reducing admissions to state prison who are recidivists by 10 percentage points.


# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## HIGHLIGHTS (Continued):

- Overall recidivism rates for released inmates who transition through a Community Corrections Center (CCC) have generally declined since 2005.
- In most recent years, the rearrest rates for released offenders who are paroled to a Center are lower than for those who are paroled directly home ("to the street"), whereas reincarceration rates and overall recidivism rates are higher for those who are paroled to a Center compared to those who are paroled directly home ("to the street").
- After accounting for other important differences which may affect whether a released inmate is paroled to a Center versus paroled directly home, those paroled to a Center still demonstrate a higher overall recidivism rate than those paroled directly home (65.7% vs. 61.2% respectively, for the most recent 3-year overall recidivism rates).
- Among those released offenders who survived at least six months in the community without recidivating, those who spent their first 3 to 6 months in a Center had a significantly lower 1-year overall recidivism rate than those who were paroled directly home (15% vs. 18%).

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**FIGURE 1: PENNSYLVANIA'S RECIDIVISM FLOW**



## RELEASE TYPES:

**Parole:** Inmates released from state prison to serve the rest of their sentence on parole.

**Max Out:** Inmates released from state prison after serving their maximum sentence.

## REINCARCERATION TYPES:

**Technical Parole Violation (TPV):** A TPV occurs when a parolee violates a condition of his/her parole that is not necessarily an illegal act (i.e., entering a bar or not reporting to an agent).

**Convicted Parole Violation (CPV):** A CPV occurs when a parolee violates a condition of parole that is also against the law (i.e., using drugs).

**New Court Commitment:** A new court commitment occurs when a released inmate is arrested, convicted in court, and is sentenced to prison for a new criminal charge.

Figure 1 depicts a typical recidivism flow for Pennsylvania's state correctional system. PA DOC can release inmates through two mechanisms: parole and max out. Released inmates can return to PA DOC through a technical parole violation (TPV), a convicted parole violation (CPV), or as a new court commitment (see box on the left for the explanations of different release and reincarceration types).

Those who are paroled can return to prison through a TPV, a CPV, or a new court commitment. A parolee can be rearrested without being reincarcerated, and conversely can be reincarcerated without being rearrested.

Those who are released from prison by maxing out their sentence can only return to prison after they are arrested for a new crime, convicted, and sentenced to prison through a court. Note that a released inmate who is rearrested is not always reincarcerated. But if reincarceration in state prison is the given sentence for the arrest, the recidivist will then be reincarcerated with PA DOC and will be paroled or max out again after serving new time.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## SECTION 1: RECIDIVISM RATE TRENDS

**FIGURE 2: 2000-2008 3-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES**




Figure 2 shows a comparison of 3-year recidivism rates for inmates released between 2000 and 2008. Those released from prison who were reincarcerated or rearrested within three years of their release date were included in these measures. The 3-year reincarceration rate peaked at 49.3% in 2005 and declined to 43.0% in 2008. The 3-year rearrest rates have been consistently higher than the reincarceration rates. The 3-year rearrest rate has grown from 47.2% in 2000 to 50.7% in 2008.

The 3-year overall recidivism rate has remained relatively stable over the eight years shown. In the latest year (2008), 70.6% of the overall recidivism measure consisted of rearrest events, while reincarceration events accounted for the other



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT


From 2000 to 2008, the rearrest rates for released inmates in Pennsylvania grew slightly. However, according to Table 1, in 2010, the 6-month and 1-year rearrest rates declined (12.3% and 23.7%, respectively). The 2008 3-year rearrest rate was 50.7%. The 6-month rearrest rate peaked in 2009 (14.5%), the 1-year rearrest rate peaked in 2007/2008 (25.9%), and the 3-year rearrest rate peaked in 2005 (51.1%).

Figure 3 depicts the 6-month, 1-year, and 3-year rearrest rates for inmates released from Pennsylvania state prisons from 2000 to 2010. The 3-year rearrest rate has been more than double the 1-year rate in most years.

**TABLE 1: 2000 - 2010 REARREST RATES**

Year of Release	Rearrest Rates		
	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year
2000	12.4%	23.0%	47.2%
2001	12.9%	23.8%	47.6%
2002	12.7%	23.3%	48.2%
2003	12.0%	23.0%	48.4%
2004	12.7%	23.6%	49.1%
2005	13.8%	25.1%	51.1%
2006	13.2%	25.1%	50.6%
2007	13.9%	25.9%	50.4%
2008	14.2%	25.9%	50.7%
2009	14.5%	25.4%	N/A
2010	12.3%	23.7%	N/A

**FIGURE 3: 2000-2010 REARREST RATES**



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT


Table 2 shows the reincarceration rates of Pennsylvania inmates released between 2000 and 2010. The reincarceration rates rose during the first half of the decade and declined slightly in the second half, although, the 6-month (12.0%) and 1-year (22.5%) reincarceration rates in 2010 increased slightly. The 2008 3-year reincarceration rate was 43.0%, the lowest in the previous eight years. Given that the 3-year reincarceration rates have generally tracked the 6-month and 1-year reincarceration rates, it is likely that the 3-year reincarceration rate may increase for those released in 2009 and 2010.

The 6-month, 1-year, and 3-year reincarceration rates are depicted in Figure 4. The reincarceration rates usually doubled from six months to one year. After one year, the reincarceration rates seemed to slow down, given that the 3-year reincarceration rates typically are not quite double the 1-year rates of the same year.

**TABLE 2: 2000—2010 REINCARCERATION RATES**

Year of Release	Reincarceration Rates		
	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year
2000	12.5%	24.0%	45.9%
2001	13.9%	25.8%	46.3%
2002	13.0%	24.9%	45.4%
2003	13.7%	26.1%	47.1%
2004	13.9%	27.2%	48.0%
2005	16.3%	29.2%	49.3%
2006	14.6%	26.3%	46.0%
2007	12.5%	23.4%	43.9%
2008	11.2%	22.0%	43.0%
2009	10.7%	20.1%	N/A
2010	12.0%	22.5%	N/A

**FIGURE 4: 2000-2010 REINCARCERATION RATES**





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
According to Figure 5, the overall recidivism rates for inmates released from state prison in Pennsylvania between 2000 and 2010 appear strikingly steady. In 2010, the 6-month overall recidivism rate declined slightly (20.0%) while the 1-year overall recidivism rate was also slightly down at 35.0%. The 2008 3-year overall recidivism rate was 62.0%. The 6-month overall recidivism rate peaked in 2001 (22.6%), the 1-year overall recidivism rate peaked in 2001 and again in 2005 (38.6%), and the 3-year overall recidivism rate peaked in 2005 (64.4%). See Table 3 for the full breakdown of the overall recidivism rates.

Over the ten-year span, approximately 64% of the first recidivism events have been a rearrest while only 36% have been a reincarceration.

**TABLE 3: 2000 - 2010 OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES**

Year of Release	Overall Recidivism Rates		
	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year
2000	21.4%	37.2%	63.4%
2001	22.6%	38.6%	63.1%
2002	21.7%	37.7%	63.1%
2003	21.0%	37.6%	63.0%
2004	20.7%	37.5%	63.8%
2005	22.2%	38.6%	64.4%
2006	20.2%	36.4%	62.7%
2007	19.9%	35.8%	62.2%
2008	20.6%	37.0%	62.0%
2009	20.8%	35.5%	N/A
2010	20.0%	35.0%	N/A

**FIGURE 5: 2000-2010 OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES**



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**FIGURE 6: 3-YEAR REINCARCERATION RATES BY TIME TO REINCARCERATION (2008 RELEASES)**




Figure 6 displays the number and proportion of recidivism events among those who are reincarcerated within 3 years from release. The overall declining curve suggests that those who return to prison tend to do so relatively soon after their release. According to Figure 6, over half of the inmates released in 2008 who were reincarcerated within three years were reincarcerated within 12 months of their release. In fact, more than 1,000 inmates were reincarcerated per month during each month, through month 12 after release. Three quarters of the inmates released in 2008 who were reincarcerated within three years were returned to prison in approximately 19 months.



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**FIGURE 7: 5-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES IN PENNSYLVANIA (2006 RELEASES)**




Figure 7 shows the cumulative recidivism rates for inmates released in 2006, over a five year period of time since release. The reincarceration rates are slightly higher than the rearrest rates in the first year and a half after release. At the second year mark, the rearrest rates surpass and remain higher than the reincarceration rates.


**TABLE 4: 5-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES**

	Reincarceration Rate	Rearrest Rate	Overall Recidivism Rate
1 Year	26.3%	25.1%	36.2%
2 Year	39.2%	40.2%	53.1%
3 Year	46.0%	50.7%	62.7%
4 Year	50.0%	57.7%	68.6%
5 Year	52.8%	60.7%	71.1%

According to Table 4, after the first year period, the reincarceration rate is 26.3%, the rearrest rate is 25.1% and the overall recidivism rate is 36.2% for the inmates released in 2006. After three years, the reincarceration rate is 46.0%, the rearrest rate is 50.7%, and the overall recidivism rate is 62.7%. Slightly more than half of those who recidivated (rearrested or reincarcerated) within three years actually recidivated within the first year. This shows the slowing rate of recidivism as time since release elapses. Finally, the 5-year reincarceration rate is 52.8%, rearrest rate is 60.7%, and the overall recidivism rate is 71.1%. The 5-year recidivism rates increased from the 3-year rates by only a small increment, indicating a further slow-down of recidivism rates as the time since release grows longer. This slow down can be seen in Figure 7 as the slopes of the recidivism lines increasingly flatten over time.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**FIGURE 8: 20-YEAR LONG VIEW OF REINCARCERATION RATES**



Taking a longer view, from 1990 to 2010, reincarceration rates have remained fairly stable in Pennsylvania, ranging from 20% to 29% for inmates reincarcerated within one year, and 41% to 50% for those reincarcerated within three years of their release from state prison (see Figure 8).<sup>1</sup> Both 1-year and 3-year rates had a peak in 1994 and trough in 1996. After another peak in 2005, reincarceration rates began to decline from 2005 to 2009, reaching a low in 2009 with a 1-year rate of 20.1%. However, in 2010, the 1-year rate increased by almost 10%, suggesting that an upward trend in reincarceration rates may be occurring, given that the 3-year rates appear to follow the trends of the 1-year rates historically.


**TABLE 5: 20-YEAR LONG VIEW OF REINCARCERATION**

Year of Release	Inmates Released	Inmates Reincarcerated			
		1-Year		3-Year	
		Number	Rate	Number	Rate
1990	6,702	1,461	21.8%	2,788	41.6%
1992	8,057	2,023	25.1%	3,766	46.7%
1994	8,523	2,360	27.7%	4,306	50.5%
1996	7,049	1,493	21.2%	2,939	41.7%
1998	8,927	2,048	22.9%	3,807	42.6%
2000	10,934	2,628	24.0%	5,015	45.9%
2002	11,030	2,744	24.9%	5,012	45.4%
2004	13,913	3,780	27.2%	6,680	48.0%
2006	13,762	3,625	26.3%	6,328	46.0%
2008	13,814	3,042	22.0%	5,944	43.0%
2010	16,764	3,767	22.5%	N/A	N/A

## SECTION 2: RECIDIVISM RATES BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS

### Table 6: Top 10 Counties with Highest Rearrest Rates

### FIGURE 9: 3-YEAR REARREST RATES BY COUNTY IN PENNSYLVANIA




# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

Table 7 shows the ten counties with the highest 3-year reincarceration rates. Similar to Table 6, the county designation represents the county where the released inmate was originally convicted before commitment to state prison. The average statewide 3-year reincarceration rate in Pennsylvania between 2006 and 2008 was 43%. The median reincarceration rate for all counties was 41%. In contrast to the rearrest rates, which tended to show higher rates for more populous counties, the counties with the highest reincarceration rates are mostly rural and relatively less populous. Figure 10 shows the 3-year reincarceration rates of all 67 Pennsylvania counties.

**TABLE 7: TOP 10 COUNTIES WITH HIGHEST REINCARCERATION RATES**

County	2006-2008 Releases	3-Year Reincarcerations	
		Number	Rate
Montour	30	16	53.3%
Clinton	79	42	53.2%
Lackawanna	809	421	52.0%
Bedford	80	41	51.3%
Lycoming	578	281	48.6%
Union	103	50	48.5%
Huntingdon	52	25	48.1%
Dauphin	1,748	827	47.3%
Franklin	450	210	46.7%
Lehigh	958	444	46.3%

**FIGURE 10: 3-YEAR REINCARCERATION RATES BY COUNTY IN PENNSYLVANIA**






# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

Table 8 shows the ten counties with the highest 3-year overall recidivism rates. The statewide average overall recidivism rate for Pennsylvania between 2006 and 2008 is 62%, while the median overall recidivism rate of Pennsylvania's 67 counties is 54%. This discrepancy between the statewide recidivism rates and the median county rate suggests that more populous counties, such as Dauphin, Philadelphia, and Allegheny tend to have higher overall recidivism rates which drive up the statewide rate. Figure 11 shows the 3-year overall recidivism rates for all 67 counties.

**TABLE 8: TOP 10 COUNTIES WITH HIGHEST OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATE**

County	2006-2008 Releases	3-Year Overall Recidivism	
		Number	Rate
Dauphin	1,739	1,171	67.3%
Philadelphia	10,394	6,811	65.5%
Allegheny	2,826	1,748	61.9%
Montgomery	1,211	747	61.7%
Blair	349	215	61.6%
Cambria	205	125	61.0%
Lycoming	607	369	60.8%
Lackawanna	896	543	60.6%
York	1,297	780	60.1%
Huntingdon	55	33	60.0%

**FIGURE 11: 3-YEAR OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY COUNTY IN PENNSYLVANIA**





# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

Table 9 shows the 3-year rearrest rates by Pennsylvania metropolitan area<sup>2</sup> for inmates released in 2006 to 2008. Consistent with the rearrest rates by county, the Philadelphia metropolitan area had the highest 3-year rearrest rate of the 2006-2008 released inmates. The Harrisburg-Carlisle metropolitan area rate was second. Rounding out the top five metropolitan areas with the highest rearrest rates are Altoona, York-Hanover, and Pittsburgh. The top five metropolitan areas contain large Pennsylvania cities.

Table 10 shows that Williamsport had the highest 3-year reincarceration rate for the 2006-2008 released inmates. Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, Harrisburg-

Carlisle, York-Hanover, and Allentown are also included in the five highest metropolitan areas according to their 3-year reincarceration rates. As shown on the previous map of incarceration rates by county, these less populous metropolitan areas tend to have higher reincarceration rates.

**TABLE 9: 3-YEAR REARREST RATES BY METROPOLITAN AREAS**

Metropolitan Area	2006-2008 Releases	3-Year Rearrests	
		Number	Rate
Philadelphia	14,398	8,248	57.3%
Harrisburg-Carlisle	2,059	1,159	56.3%
Altoona	349	196	56.2%
York-Hanover	1,297	641	49.4%
Pittsburgh	4,916	2,408	49.0%
Williamsport	607	295	48.6%
Allentown	1,806	852	47.2%
Lancaster	856	389	45.4%
Scranton-Wilkes Barre	1,658	737	44.5%
Johnstown	205	88	42.9%
Reading	1,667	701	42.1%
Erie	1,424	573	40.2%
Lebanon	419	168	40.1%
State College	158	60	38.0%

**TABLE 10: 3-YEAR REINCARCERATION RATES BY METROPOLITAN AREAS**

Metropolitan Area	2006-2008 Releases	3-Year Reincarcerations	
		Number	Rate
Williamsport	578	281	48.6%
Scranton-Wilkes Barre	1,517	721	47.5%
Harrisburg-Carlisle	2070	945	45.7%
York-Hanover	1,278	577	45.1%
Allentown	1,755	776	44.2%
Johnstown	194	82	42.3%
Lebanon	400	169	42.3%
Pittsburgh	4808	2026	42.1%
Altoona	339	141	41.6%
Philadelphia	14084	5791	41.1%
Reading	1,629	669	41.1%
Erie	1,357	546	40.2%
Lancaster	868	335	38.6%
State College	159	49	30.8%

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**TABLE 11: 3-YEAR OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATE BY METROPOLITAN AREA**

Metropolitan Area	2006-2008 Releases	3-Year Overall Recidivism	
		Number	Rate
Harrisburg-Carlisle	2,059	1,344	65.3%
Philadelphia	14,398	9,082	63.1%
Altoona	349	215	61.6%
Johnstown	205	125	61.0%
Williamsport	607	369	60.8%
York-Hanover	1,297	780	60.1%
Pittsburgh	4,916	2,912	59.2%
Scranton-Wilkes Barre	1,658	962	58.0%
Allentown	1,806	1,037	57.4%
Lancaster	856	457	53.4%
Reading	1,667	865	51.9%
Lebanon	419	212	50.6%
Erie	1,424	715	50.2%
State College	158	66	41.8%

Table 11 shows the 3-year overall recidivism rates of the 2006-2008 releases ranked by metropolitan areas. The Harrisburg-Carlisle metropolitan area had the highest average 3-year overall recidivism rate based on inmates released between 2006 and 2008, followed by Philadelphia, Altoona, Johnstown, and Williamsport.



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## SECTION 3: RECIDIVISM RATES BY DEMOGRAPHICS

**FIGURE 12: 3-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES BY GENDER**




Figure 12 shows 3-year recidivism rates by gender, suggesting that men are at a higher risk of being both rearrested and reincarcerated within three years of their release from Pennsylvania state prison when compared to women.

**FIGURE 13: 3-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY**





Figure 13 shows 3-year recidivism rates broken down by race/ethnicity<sup>3</sup>, suggesting that Blacks report the highest rates of rearrest rates and overall recidivism, followed by Hispanics, and non-Hispanic Whites<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, reincarceration rates by race are much more similar.




# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT


**FIGURE 14: 3-YEAR REARREST RATES BY AGE GROUP**



**FIGURE 16: 3-YEAR OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY AGE GROUP**



**FIGURE 15: 3-YEAR REINCARCERATION RATES BY AGE GROUP**



The 3-year reincarceration rates of inmates released in 2008 show a similar declining reincarceration rate pattern with age, according to Figure 15.


The 3-year overall recidivism rates by age group follow the same declining pattern as with the rearrest and reincarceration rates, according to Figure 16.

These age group findings suggest that age has a strong negative correlation with recidivism. In other words, the older an inmate is at the time of his/her release, the less likely he/she is to recidivate.

Figure 14 shows the 3-year rearrest rates by age at time of release, suggesting that younger age groups<sup>5</sup> are at the highest risk for recidivating. A 21 year old released inmate's risk of being rearrested is almost 25 percentage points higher than an over 50 year old inmate.


# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**FIGURE 17: 3-YEAR OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY PRIOR ARRESTS**



NOTE: The number of priors does not include the current arrest.

**FIGURE 18: 3-YEAR OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY PRIOR INCARCERATIONS**



NOTE: The number of priors does not include the current incarceration.

Prior criminal history appears to also be highly associated with whether an inmate will continue to commit crimes after being released from state prison. Figures 17 and 18 show the overall recidivism rates of inmates released in 2008 by the number of prior arrests or incarcerations<sup>6</sup>, respectively. As depicted, the general trend is that the risk of recidivating increases with higher numbers of priors.

According to Figure 17, the risk of recidivating within three years, by either rearrests or reincarcerations, increases as the number of prior arrests increases.

Figure 18 depicts a large jump in the 3-year overall recidivism rate between inmates released from Pennsylvania state prison for the first time (zero prior incarcerations) and those released inmates who had been incarcerated before (more than one prior incarcerations). After an inmate is released from Pennsylvania state prison with at least one prior, he/she is more than 80% likely to be rearrested or reincarcerated within three years of release.



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## SECTION 4: RECIDIVISM RATES BY CRIME TYPES

Table 12 depicts the 3-year recidivism rates for inmates released in 2008, by the type of crime committed that led to their original incarceration in a Pennsylvania state prison. It is important to note that inmates who recidivated were not necessarily rearrested or reincarcerated for the same crime as the original commitment crime.

The 3-year rearrest, reincarceration, and overall recidivism rates for Part I crime are 48.6%, 44.1%, and 62.6%, respectively.

The Part I offenses with higher 3-year rearrest and reincarceration rates were: Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Burglary, and Theft/Larceny. The Part I offenses that had higher 3-year overall recidivism rates were: Robbery, Burglary, and Theft/Larceny.

The 3-year rearrest rate for Part II crime is 48.5%, very close to the 3-year rearrest rate for Part I crime. The 3-year reincarceration rate for Part II

crime is 39.6%, which is 4.5 percentage points below the 3-year reincarceration rate for Part I crime. The Part II 3-year overall recidivism rate is 58.1%, which is 4.5 percentage points lower than the overall recidivism rate for Part I crimes. The Part II offenses that had higher 3-year rearrest rates were: Other Assault, Stolen Property, Forgery, Drug Offenses, Weapons, and Prison Breach. The Part II offenses that had higher 3-year reincarceration rates were: Stolen Property, Forgery, Drug Offenses, Weapons, Prison Breach, and Part II Other. The Part II offenses that had higher 3-year overall recidivism rates were: Other Assault, Fraud, Stolen Property, Forgery, Other Sexual Offenses, Weapons, Prison Breach, and Kidnapping.

Table 13 depicts the 3-year recidivism rates by aggregate crime categories for inmates released in 2008. Property crimes had the highest 3-year recidivism rates for all three measures of recidivism.





# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**TABLE 12: 3-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES BY COMMITMENT CRIME TYPE FOR 2008 RELEASES**

Offense Category	3-Year Rearrests		3-Year Reincarcerations		3-Year Overall Recidivism	
	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate
<b>Part I</b>						
Murder/ Manslaughter	144	33.0%	145	33.3%	227	52.1%
Forcible Rape	78	25.8%	71	23.5%	149	49.3%
Robbery	881	52.8%	806	48.4%	1050	63.0%
Aggravated Assault	567	48.8%	516	44.4%	700	60.2%
Burglary	504	52.6%	457	47.7%	695	72.5%
Theft/Larceny	526	53.7%	449	45.9%	639	65.3%
Arson	17	21.3%	21	26.3%	37	46.3%
<b>Total: Part I</b>	<b>2,717</b>	<b>48.6%</b>	<b>2,465</b>	<b>44.1%</b>	<b>3,497</b>	<b>62.6%</b>
<b>Part II</b>						
Other Assault	103	51.8%	59	29.6%	123	61.8%
Fraud	20	47.6%	15	35.7%	38	90.5%
Stolen Property	148	63.0%	116	49.4%	187	79.6%
Forgery	100	49.5%	85	42.1%	131	64.9%
Statutory Rape	5	41.7%	3	25.0%	6	50.0%
Other Sexual Offenses	120	31.8%	99	26.3%	227	60.2%
Drug Offenses	2,143	50.6%	1,695	40.0%	2,427	57.3%
Weapons	279	60.0%	206	44.3%	333	71.6%
DUI	184	27.6%	169	25.4%	256	38.4%
Prison Breach	126	62.4%	103	51.0%	144	71.3%
Kidnapping	16	39.0%	16	39.0%	30	73.2%
Part II Other	670	48.4%	625	45.2%	783	56.6%
<b>Total: Part II</b>	<b>3,914</b>	<b>48.5%</b>	<b>3,191</b>	<b>39.6%</b>	<b>4,685</b>	<b>58.1%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>6,631</b>	<b>48.6%</b>	<b>5,656</b>	<b>41.4%</b>	<b>8,182</b>	<b>59.9%</b>

NOTE: The total 3-year reincarceration, rearrest, and overall recidivism rates do not match the 3-year rates presented at the beginning of the report due to missing offense category data. Also, rearrest totals are missing 30 of the original incarceration offenses.

**TABLE 13: 3-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES BY AGGREGATE CRIME CATEGORY FOR 2008 RELEASES**

Crime Category	Rearrest Rate	Reincarceration Rate	Overall Recidivism Rate
Violent	45.6%	40.9%	59.9%
Property	52.7%	45.8%	69.2%
Drugs	50.6%	40.0%	57.3%
Public Order/Other	46.3%	40.6%	55.8%



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**TABLE 14: BREAKDOWN OF 3-YEAR REARRESTS BY REARREST CRIME TYPE FOR 2008 RELEASES**

Offense Category	Rearrests	% of Total
<b>Part I</b>		
Murder/ Manslaughter	84	1.3%
Forcible Rape	40	0.6%
Robbery	281	4.2%
Aggravated Assault	287	4.3%
Burglary	278	4.2%
Theft/Larceny	804	12.1%
Arson	5	0.1%
<b>Total: Part I</b>	<b>1,779</b>	<b>26.7%</b>
<b>Part II</b>		
Other Assault	230	3.5%
Fraud	107	1.6%
Stolen Property	290	4.4%
Forgery	8	0.1%
Statutory Rape	0	0.0%
Other Sexual Offenses	165	2.5%
Drug Offenses	1,931	29.0%
Weapons	299	4.5%
DUI	585	8.8%
Prison Breach	166	2.5%
Kidnapping	6	0.1%
Part II Other	1,095	16.4%
<b>Total: Part II</b>	<b>4,882</b>	<b>73.3%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>6,661</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table 14 displays the crime type of the most serious rearrest charge for inmates released in 2008 who were rearrested within three years. Part I crimes accounted for 26.7% of the rearrests within 3 years of release. Almost half of the crimes that released inmates were rearrested for were in the theft/larceny category. Other common Part I crimes that released inmates were arrested for were: Aggravated Assault, Burglary, and Robbery. Part II crimes accounted for 73.3% of the rearrests within 3 years of release. Part II crimes accounted for 73.3% of the rearrests within 3 years of release. Part II crimes accounted for 73.3% of the rearrests within 3 years of release.

inmates were rearrested for within three years of their 2008 release from a Pennsylvania state prison. Four out of 10 of the Part II rearrests were drug offenses. Other significant Part II offenses that released inmates were rearrested for DUIs and a variety of other minor offenses (i.e., "Part II Other").

**FIGURE 19: 3-YEAR REARREST RATES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL REARRESTS**




Figure 19 depicts the percentage breakdown of rearrest into aggregate crime categories: violent, property, drugs, and public order/other<sup>8</sup>. The highest percentage of rearrests occurred for Public Order/Other (32.3%), followed by Drug offenses (29.0%), Property crimes (22.4%), and Violent crimes (16.3%). As mentioned previously, the types of crime that a released inmate was rearrested for is not necessarily the same type of crime that he/she was originally incarcerated for.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## SECTION 5: RECIDIVISM RATES BY CRIME TYPE SPECIALIZATION

**TABLE 15: 3-YEAR REARREST BY COMMITMENT AND REARREST CRIME TYPES (2008 RELEASES)**

Crime Type for Original Commitment	Rearrest Crime Type				
	<i>Violent</i>	<i>Property</i>	<i>Drugs</i>	<i>Public Order/Other</i>	<i>No Rearrest</i>
Violent	13.1%	9.0%	10.4%	12.7%	54.8%
Property	7.1%	24.7%	9.0%	11.9%	47.3%
Drugs	7.3%	8.0%	22.4%	12.8%	49.4%
Public Order/Other	7.7%	11.2%	12.3%	16.8%	52.1%

In this report, crime type specialization is defined as the propensity for released inmates to be rearrested for a crime type that is the same as the crime type for the original commitment. Table 15 displays the combination of commitment crime types (the rows) and the percentage of different rearrest crime types (including the possibility of no rearrest within three years). This allows us to examine what proportion of those who were initially committed for each of the four crime categories were rearrested for the same crime category, or for a different category. The values in the diagonals of the table (highlighted in yellow) represent the proportion recidivating for the same crime type as their commitment offense (i.e., specialists). The values in the off-diagonals represent the proportion committing different crime types than their commitment offense (i.e., non-specialists).

According to Table 15, some degree of specialization seems to exist among the inmates released in 2008. The tendency of specialization is particularly stronger for property and drug crimes. Released inmates who were originally incarcerated for property crimes returned to property crimes at a

24.7% rearrest rate, while rearrests for violent (7.1%), drugs (9.0%), and public order/other (11.9%) crimes were at lower rates. Released inmates who were incarcerated for drug crimes returned to drug crimes at a 22.4% rate, while violent (7.3%), property (8.0%), and public order/other (12.8%) crimes were at significantly lower rates.

Specialization is less evident in violent and public order crimes. Those who were originally incarcerated for violent crimes were rearrested for a violent crime 13.1% of the time, a slightly higher rate than the rates for public order/other (12.7%), drugs (10.4%), and property (9.0%). Finally, inmates originally incarcerated for public order/other crimes returned to public order/other rearrests at 16.8%, which is higher than the rates for drugs (12.3%), property (11.2%), and violent (7.7%). Overall, this specialization pattern of property and drug offenders tend to have higher propensity to repeat similar crimes is consistent with what has been found in national recidivism studies. In general, released inmates tend to generalize rather than specialize in their recidivism crime types.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## SECTION 6: RECIDIVISM RATES BY TYPE OF RELEASE

**TABLE 16: 3-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES BY TYPE OF RELEASE FOR 2008 RELEASES**

Type of Release	Reincarceration Rate	Rearrest Rate
Parole	50.5%	47.1%
Max Out	20.4%	62.0%

**TABLE 17: 3-YEAR RECIDIVISM RATES BY TYPE OF PAROLE RELEASE FOR 2008 RELEASES**

Type of Parole	Reincarceration Rate	Rearrest Rate
Initial Parole	46.9%	43.7%
Reparole	58.6%	55.1%

**TABLE 18: 3-YEAR BREAKDOWN OF REINCARCERATION BY TYPE OF RETURN FOR 2008 PAROLE RELEASES**

Type of Return	% of Total Returns
Technical Parole Violator	61.5%
Convicted Parole Violator	33.4%
New Court Commitment	5.0%

NOTE: Does not include 2008 Releases who maxed out their sentences. All Max Out releases should return as new court commits in the event that they return to prison.

For an in-depth description of the recidivism flow in the Pennsylvania state correctional system, refer to Figure 1 on page 6. According to Table 16, 50.5% of the inmates released on parole in 2008 were reincarcerated within three years, while only 20.4% of the released inmates who maxed out in 2008 were reincarcerated within three years. The higher reincarceration rate for paroled inmates is likely due to violating the conditions of their parole, since prisoners who max-out are not subject to such conditions. Of the inmates released in 2008 who were paroled, 47.1% were rearrested within three years while 62.0% of those who maxed out were rearrested within three years.

According to Table 17, 46.9% of the inmates paroled in 2008 for the first time (initial parole) were reincarcerated within three years of their release, while 59.8% of the inmates paroled in 2008 for the second or more time (reparole) were reincarcerated within three years of their release. Of those paroled in 2008, 43.7% paroled for the first time were rearrested within three years, while 55.1% of those paroled for the second or more time were rearrested within three years.

Of the parolees who were reincarcerated within three years of their 2008 release date, 61.5% were returned as TPVs (see Table 18). Another 33.4% of reincarcerated parolees were returned as CPVs. The remaining 5.0% were reincarcerated through the court system as a new court commitment.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## SECTION 7: RECIDIVISM AS A FRACTION OF TOTAL ARRESTS

**TABLE 19: 2010 PENNSYLVANIA CRIME TYPES BY RELEASED OFFENDERS**

	Violent	Property	Drugs	TOTAL
Arrests of Released Inmates in 2010	2,506	4,661	5,087	12,254
Total Arrests in 2010 <sup>9</sup>	20,275	48,739	51,443	120,457
<b>% of Arrests Attributable to Released Inmates</b>	<b>12.4%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>9.9%</b>	<b>10.2%</b>

Table 19 depicts the most serious crimes per arrest by released inmates in Pennsylvania as a percentage of the total Part I<sup>10</sup> arrests in Pennsylvania in 2010. Inmates released from a Pennsylvania state prison between 2000 and 2010 were included in this analysis.

In Table 19, the 2010 crimes committed by released inmates are broken down into Violent (12.4%), Property (9.6%), and Drugs (9.9%) categories. These three crime categories were used to produce an average of 10.2%, the best estimate for the *total serious crime* in a year attributable to released inmates in Pennsylvania. The serious crimes included in the Violent category were murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. The serious crimes included in the Property category were burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. All drug offenses were included in the Drugs category.

Table 20 shows the arrest rates of inmates released from a Pennsylvania state prison between 2000 and 2010 as a ratio of the arrest rates for the general civilian population at risk for arrest in the time frame. For example, the violent crime arrest rate for released inmates in 2010 was 2,905 per 100,000 released inmates.

Conversely, the violent crime arrest rate for the general population in Pennsylvania was 205 per 100,000 individuals in 2010. These rates indicate that released inmates were 14 times more likely to be arrested for a violent crime in Pennsylvania in 2010 than individuals in the general population. Following this logic, inmates released from a Pennsylvania prison between 2000 and 2010 were 11 times more likely to be arrested for property and drug crimes in 2010. Overall, inmates released from a Pennsylvania state prison between 2000 and 2010 were 12 times more likely to be arrested for a crime in 2010 than the general population.

Overall comparisons are misleading though. Inmates released in 2000 were far less likely to be arrested in 2010 than inmates released in 2009. In fact, inmates released in 2000 were only three times more likely to be arrested in 2010 than the general population. Conversely, inmates released in 2009 were 17 times more likely to be arrested in 2010 than the general population (18 times more likely for violent crimes, 16 times for property crimes, and 17 times for drug crimes). This suggests that recidivism is mostly attributable to recently released inmates, and the longer that released inmates remain arrest free, the less likely that they are to be rearrested.

**TABLE 20: 2010 PENNSYLVANIA CRIME TYPES BY RELEASED OFFENDERS AS A RATIO OF GENERAL POPULATION<sup>11</sup>**

	Violent	Property	Drugs	TOTAL
Arrest Rate for Released Inmates in 2010	2,905	5,403	5,896	14,203
Arrest Rate for General Population in 2010	205	492	519	1,216
<b>General Public)</b>	<b>14-to-1</b>	<b>11-to-1</b>	<b>11-to-1</b>	<b>12-to-1</b>

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT


## SECTION 8: COST OF RECIDIVISM

**TABLE 21: COST SAVINGS BY REDUCTION IN 1-YEAR REINCARCERATION RATE**

1-Year Reincarceration Rate	Annual Bed Days	Annual Cost Savings (in millions)
Reduced by 1 Percentage Points	48,768	\$0.8
Reduced by 5 Percentage Points	234,930	\$15.0
Reduced by 10 Percentage Points	475,035	\$44.7

Table 21 shows the estimated annual cost savings by reducing the 1-year reincarceration rate by one, five, and 10 percentage points. The cost savings were calculated by taking the released inmates who were reincarcerated in 2010, from the 2009 and 2010 releases, and reducing their numbers to attain a reincarceration rate of one, five, and 10 percentage points lower. Based on a 10 percentage point reduction in the 1-yr recidivism rate, the PA DOC would save approximately 475,035 bed-days, or approximately \$44.7 million annual cost savings.

**FIGURE 20: PERCENT OF ADMISSIONS IN PA DOC ATTRIBUTABLE TO RECIDIVISTS**



Further, a second calculation was performed to estimate the annual cost savings that the PA DOC could achieve by reducing the number of admissions of inmates who had been previously released from a Pennsylvania state prison (i.e., repeat offenders, or recidivists). This is another useful way of looking at population reduction and cost savings from recidivism reduction. As depicted in Figure 20, approximately 49.6% of the total annual state prison admissions in 2010 were offenders who had previously served time in a Pennsylvania state prison. Just slightly more than half (50.4%) of the admissions in 2010 were first time inmates.

**TABLE 22: COST SAVINGS BY REDUCTION IN ADMISSIONS OF PREVIOUSLY RELEASED INMATES**

Admissions of Released Inmates	Annual Bed Days	Annual Cost Savings (in millions)
Reduced by 1 Percentage Points	25,024	\$0.4
Reduced by 5 Percentage Points	126,626	\$3.9
Reduced by 10 Percentage Points	257,573	\$16.5

Recidivists who are admitted to state prison take up approximately 1.3 million bed-days in a given year, at a cost of \$121.2 million per year. If the percentage of DOC admissions who had at least one prior state prison admission was reduced by 10 percentage points (39.6% of admissions rather than 49.6%), this reduction in annual recidivist admissions would result in an annual bed-day reduction of approximately 257,573 beds, or an annual cost savings of \$16.5 million.


# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## SECTION 9: COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM

**TABLE 23: REARREST RATES BY PAROLE RELEASE TYPE**

Release Year	6-Month Rearrests		1-Year Rearrests		3-Year Rearrests	
	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center
2005-06 Releases	12.0%	11.7%	23.2%	25.4%	49.2%	52.5%
2008-09 Releases	12.2%	10.0%	23.4%	21.8%	48.1%	47.1%
2010-11 Releases	11.8%	8.9%	21.1%	17.7%	N/A	N/A

**FIGURE 21: 1-YEAR REARREST RATES BY PAROLE RELEASE TYPE**



**Community Corrections Centers (CCCs)**, also known as halfway houses, provide a transitional process by allowing residents monitored contact with jobs and reentry services. The CCCs house inmates granted parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. The PA DOC also contracts with private vendors (CCFs) to provide specialized treatment and transitional supervision services, many in the area of substance abuse programming.

According to Figure 21, the 1-year rearrest rates of releases who were paroled directly home (i.e., “to the street”) were lower than for those paroled to a Community Corrections Center (CCC) in 2005 and 2006. From 2008 to 2011, the 1-year rearrest rates were higher for those paroled to the street.


Table 23 shows that the 1-year rearrest rates of those paroled to a CCC have declined over time. The 1-year rearrest rate of 2005-06 releases paroled to a CCC was 25.4%, while the 1-year rearrest rate was 17.7% for the 2010-11 releases. This trend did not hold for those paroled to the street, whose 1-year rearrest rates held steady and then declined for the 2010-11 releases.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**TABLE 24: REINCARCERATION RATES BY PAROLE RELEASE TYPE**

Release Year	6-Month Reincarcerations		1-Year Reincarcerations		3-Year Reincarcerations	
	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center
2005-06 Releases	11.8%	18.1%	26.3%	36.0%	47.5%	58.7%
2008-09 Releases	9.3%	16.1%	22.1%	32.0%	44.0%	53.3%
2010-11 Releases	9.8%	19.3%	22.5%	33.5%	N/A	N/A

**FIGURE 22: 1-YEAR REINCARCERATION RATES BY PAROLE RELEASE TYPE**



According to Figure 22, the 1-year reincarceration rates of releases from 2005 to 2011 for those who were paroled to the street were consistently lower than for those paroled to a CCC.

Also, the 1-year reincarceration rates seemed to be declining over time, despite a slight increase for the most recent releases. The 1-year reincarceration rate of 2005-06 releases who were paroled to a CCC was 36.0%, whereas the 1-year reincarceration rate dropped to 33.5% for the 2010-11 releases to a CCC. Mirroring this trend, the 1-year reincarceration rate of 2005-06 releases paroled to the street was 26.3%, whereas the 1-year rate dropped to 22.5% for the

2010-11 releases. Table 24 shows the 6-month and 3-year reincarceration rates for the same release years. In each case, the reincarceration rates are higher for those paroled to a CCC than for those paroled to the street.




# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**TABLE 25: OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY PAROLE RELEASE TYPE**

Release Year	6-Month Overall Recidivism		1-Year Overall Recidivism		3-Year Overall Recidivism	
	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center
2005-06 Releases	18.6%	22.8%	35.5%	42.6%	61.5%	68.6%
2008-09 Releases	17.4%	22.1%	33.8%	41.6%	59.7%	66.7%
2010-11 Releases	18.1%	24.0%	32.7%	40.5%	N/A	N/A

**FIGURE 23: 1-YEAR OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY PAROLE RELEASE TYPE**



According to Figure 23, the 1-year overall recidivism rates of releases from 2005 to 2011 who were paroled to the street were consistently lower than for those who were paroled to a CCC.

Also, the overall recidivism rates seem to be decline over time. The 1-year overall recidivism rate for 2005-06 releases to a CCC was 42.6%. For 2010-11 releases to a CCC, the 1-year overall recidivism rate decreased to 40.5%. Mirroring this trend, the 1-year overall recidivism rate for 2005-06 releases to the street was 35.5%, but for 2010-11 releases to the street the 1-year rate dropped to 32.7%. Table 25 also shows the 6-month and 3-year overall recidivism

rates for the same release groups. In each case, the overall recidivism rates have been higher for those paroled to a CCC than for those paroled to the street.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

The descriptive comparison of recidivism rates by parole release type in the previous pages is informative, but the observed differences in the recidivism rates may not represent statistically significant differences and may be due to chance variation or the influence of factors that vary between those who are paroled to the street and those who are paroled to a center which are not yet accounted for. Table 26 shows the overall recidivism rates by parole release type while controlling for various important predictors of recidivism such as age, race, prior criminal history, and risk score

(LSI-R)<sup>12</sup>. The differences in modeled recidivism rates by parole release type essentially mirror the descriptive differences in Table 25. Across the various release years (2005-2006, 2008-2009, 2010-2011), the recidivism rates of those who are paroled to a center are about 5 percentage points higher than the rates of those who are paroled to the street, despite the differences being narrower than the descriptive differences in Table 25 as a result of statistically accounting for the other factors mentioned above (e.g., age, race, prior criminal history, etc.).

**TABLE 26: MODELED OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY PAROLE RELEASE TYPE**

Release Year	6-Month Overall Recidivism		1-Year Overall Recidivism		3-Year Overall Recidivism	
	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center	Parole to Street	Parole to Center
2005-06 Releases	17.0%	20.2%	34.1%	39.5%	63.2%	67.9%
2008-09 Releases	16.4%	19.7%	33.1%	38.8%	61.2%	65.7%
2010-11 Releases	17.6%	22.6%	32.3%	38.1%	N/A	N/A



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

The higher recidivism rates of those who are paroled to a center do not necessarily indicate that the parolee's chance of recidivating increases as a result of being sent to a center. It could indicate that close monitoring provided by the centers (and to some degree Parole staff) help detect violating behaviors of parolees (criminal or otherwise) that would remain undetected if parolees did not live in centers. If this is true and centers essentially better detect violating behaviors and remove high-risk parolees from centers through arrests and reincarcerations, then we might expect that those parolees who are discharged from centers without recidivism have lower recidivism rates. Also, those who are successfully discharged from a center may benefit from the programs and treatments they receive while at the center. In order to examine this possibility further, we compared the recidivism rates of those who were discharged from a center and stayed recidivism-free for at least six months after their release from prison with those who were paroled to the street and stayed recidivism-free for at least 6 months.

The results in Table 27 show that among those who remained recidivism-free for at least six months, there was no statistically significant difference in overall recidivism rates between parolees who were assigned to a center and discharged successfully and parolees who were paroled to the street, both at one year after their release from prison (19.0% vs. 18.0% respectively) and three years after their release from prison (53.0% vs. 52.0% respectively).<sup>13</sup> We also looked at whether the length of stay at a center matters to the recidivism rates of parolees who were discharged from a center and stayed recidivism-free for at least six months. Again, the recidivism rates of those who

were assigned to a center were statistically no higher than the rates of those who were paroled to the street, but those who stayed at a center for three to six months actually had statistically lower recidivism rates than those paroled to the street. The fact that a longer stay at a center is associated with lower recidivism rates than the rates of those paroled to the street is consistent with the possibility that centers efficiently detect and help sanction violations and remove high-risk parolees so that those who are successfully discharged from a center consist of relatively low-risk parolees. Regardless of the explanation, we were able to substantiate in this analysis at least one comparison where those who were paroled to a center had a lower recidivism rate than those who were paroled directly to the street.

**TABLE 27: MODELED OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY SIX MONTH SURVIVAL TIME**

Parole Type	Overall Recidivism Rates	
	1-Year	3-Year
Parole To Center	19.0%	53.0%
< 1 Month	17.0%	60.0%
1 to <3 Months	19.0%	54.0%
3 to <6 Months	15.0%*	50.0%
Parole To Street	18.0%	52.0%

NOTE: Parole To Center 3 to <6 Months 1-Year Overall Recidivism rate is significantly different from Parole To Street at  $p < .05$

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**FIGURE 24: 1-YEAR OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATE PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCE COMPARED TO PAROLE TO STREET**




Figure 24 shows the overall recidivism rates for all the individual Community Corrections Centers (CCCs) and contracted facilities (CCFs) with more than 10 parolees, in comparison to the recidivism rate of those who are paroled to the street. By setting the recidivism rate of the “parole to the street” group at zero, the recidivism rates for the centers are shown as the percentage points higher or lower than the recidivism rates of parole to the

the overall patterns in Table 25, only about a quarter of the centers have lower recidivism rates than those paroled to the street, and the majority of centers have much higher recidivism rates than those paroled to the street.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

The next three tables and figures (tables 28-30, figures 25-27) show the recidivism rates for some of the major contractors of community corrections facilities in Pennsylvania, along with the recidivism rate of state-run community corrections centers. The recidivism rates are displayed by the type of recidivism measure (rearrest, reincarceration, overall recidivism), by the release year (2005-2006, 2008-2009, 2010-2011), and by the length of follow-up period (6 months, 1 year, 2 years). Aside from several contractors and the state-run centers showing lower rearrest rates than those parole to the street across different release years and follow-up times, the contract facilities and the state-run centers almost always show higher overall recidivism rates.

There are several ways to display comparisons between contractors and state-run centers in terms of recidivism rates. One way is to look at the rank order of contractors and state-run centers by recidivism rates across different recidivism measures. For the 3-year follow-up, Gateway and Minsec facilities tend to have the highest recidivism rates for rearrest, reincarceration, and overall recidivism based on the 2008-09 releases, as shown in figures 25-27.

Interestingly, CEC is one of the contractors with the highest 3-year rearrest rates, but had the lowest reincarceration rate among contractors and state-run centers, although still higher than those who were paroled to the street. Firetree and Renewal consistently demonstrated fairly low recidivism rates across recidivism measures, according to figures 25-27. Another way to evaluate comparisons between contractors and state-run centers in terms of recidivism is to look at the relative change of recidivism rates over time (across release years). For the 6-month and 1-year overall recidivism rates, Gateway demonstrated the largest increase in recidivism over time, whereas Renewal demonstrated the largest decrease in recidivism over time. Firetree also demonstrated a large increase in overall recidivism over time, at least for the 1-year rate. Kintock showed highly fluctuating rates, with a large drop from 2005-06 to 2008-09, but then an increase from 2008-09 to 2010-11. Yet another way to assess comparisons in recidivism rates is to examine rates across the three follow-up periods (6-months, 1-year, and 3-year). Gateway and the state run centers are both again among the top highest overall recidivism rates across the three different follow-up periods.




# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**TABLE 28: REARREST RATES BY VENDOR**

Vendor (# of Centers)	2005-06 Release Cohort			2008-09 Release Cohort			2010-11 Release Cohort		
	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year
<b>CEC (4)</b>	14.8%	31.5%	54.9%	12.4%	21.6%	51.6%	9.0%	19.1%	N/A
<b>Firetree (4)</b>	6.5%	15.2%	47.8%	9.8%	19.7%	39.3%	9.2%	16.9%	N/A
<b>Gaudenzia (9)</b>	6.7%	13.5%	50.0%	9.2%	20.2%	46.8%	6.6%	11.6%	N/A
<b>Gateway (4)</b>	7.1%	19.0%	38.1%	9.1%	25.8%	51.5%	10.3%	21.8%	N/A
<b>Kintock (2)</b>	14.9%	31.0%	63.2%	9.6%	22.8%	47.1%	13.3%	26.7%	N/A
<b>Minsec (7)</b>	15.2%	30.3%	59.3%	10.8%	22.9%	50.7%	6.4%	12.3%	N/A
<b>Renewal (2)</b>	3.4%	24.1%	48.3%	3.6%	16.4%	29.1%	2.8%	9.7%	N/A
<b>Parole To Street</b>	12.0%	23.2%	49.2%	12.2%	23.4%	48.1%	11.8%	21.1%	N/A
<b>Parole To CCC</b>	9.2%	24.6%	48.6%	10.4%	20.4%	42.5%	13.2%	23.9%	N/A
<b>Parole To CCF</b>	12.1%	25.5%	53.2%	9.8%	22.1%	48.1%	8.3%	16.8%	N/A

**FIGURE 25: 3-YEAR REARREST RATE PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCE COMPARED TO PAROLE TO THE STREET (2008-2009 RELEASES)**




# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**TABLE 29: REINCARCERATION RATES BY VENDOR**

Vendor (# of Centers)	2005-06 Release Cohort			2008-09 Release Cohort			2010-11 Release Cohort		
	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year
<b>CEC (4)</b>	17.3%	40.7%	61.7%	16.0%	33.2%	51.6%	21.1%	36.0%	N/A
<b>Firetree (4)</b>	15.2%	27.2%	56.5%	19.7%	24.6%	55.7%	13.8%	38.5%	N/A
<b>Gaudenzia (9)</b>	17.3%	33.7%	52.9%	12.8%	37.6%	56.0%	17.2%	26.8%	N/A
<b>Gateway (4)</b>	19.0%	35.7%	54.8%	18.2%	36.4%	56.1%	27.6%	54.0%	N/A
<b>Kintock (2)</b>	21.8%	47.1%	69.0%	14.0%	27.2%	52.9%	16.7%	36.7%	N/A
<b>Minsec (7)</b>	17.2%	35.2%	57.2%	17.9%	33.2%	56.5%	22.8%	34.2%	N/A
<b>Renewal (2)</b>	27.6%	48.3%	72.4%	12.7%	30.9%	54.5%	16.7%	34.7%	N/A
<b>Parole To Street</b>	11.8%	26.3%	47.5%	9.3%	22.1%	44.0%	9.8%	22.5%	N/A
<b>Parole To CCC</b>	26.1%	40.1%	62.0%	20.4%	34.6%	53.3%	17.6%	30.2%	N/A
<b>Parole To CCF</b>	16.7%	35.3%	58.1%	15.1%	31.4%	53.2%	19.5%	34.0%	N/A

**FIGURE 26: 3-YEAR REINCARCERATION RATE PERCENTAGE POINT DIFFERENCE COMPARED TO PAROLE TO THE STREET (2008-2009 RELEASES)**






# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

**TABLE 30: OVERALL RECIDIVISM RATES BY VENDOR**

Vendor (# of Centers)	2005-06 Releases			2008-09 Releases			2010-11 Releases		
	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year	6-Month	1-Year	3-Year
<b>CEC (4)</b>	22.2%	45.1%	71.0%	24.0%	41.2%	67.2%	24.4%	42.1%	N/A
<b>Firetree (4)</b>	18.5%	31.5%	64.1%	26.2%	39.3%	60.7%	18.5%	43.1%	N/A
<b>Gaudenzia (9)</b>	18.3%	36.5%	65.4%	18.3%	43.1%	65.1%	22.2%	33.3%	N/A
<b>Gateway (4)</b>	26.2%	45.2%	64.3%	21.2%	43.9%	71.2%	32.2%	59.8%	N/A
<b>Kintock (2)</b>	25.3%	48.3%	78.2%	19.1%	37.5%	65.4%	21.7%	41.7%	N/A
<b>Minsec (7)</b>	22.8%	42.1%	69.7%	23.8%	41.3%	70.0%	24.7%	38.8%	N/A
<b>Renewal (2)</b>	31.0%	62.1%	75.9%	14.5%	41.8%	63.6%	18.1%	40.3%	N/A
<b>Parole To Street</b>	18.6%	35.5%	61.5%	17.4%	33.8%	59.7%	18.1%	32.7%	N/A
<b>Parole To CCC</b>	30.3%	47.9%	70.4%	27.9%	45.4%	67.5%	27.3%	42.0%	N/A
<b>Parole To CCF</b>	21.5%	41.6%	68.3%	20.8%	40.7%	66.5%	23.5%	40.3%	N/A

**FIGURE 27: 3-Year Overall Recidivism Rate Percentage Point Difference Compared to Parole to the Street (2008-2009 Releases)**



# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## Appendix A—Technical Definition of Recidivism/Data Sources

### Definition of Recidivism

The PA DOC identifies a recidivist as an inmate who, after release from prison, commits a new offense or violates parole, resulting in an arrest, an incarceration, or both. It is important to note that this report only captures recidivism events that occurred in Pennsylvania, and does not include recidivism events that may have occurred in another state. The recidivism rate for rearrests, reincarcerations, and overall recidivism is calculated using:

$$\text{Recidivism Rate } (t, y) = \frac{\text{\# of released inmates who recidivated within time period } t}{\text{\# of total releases in calendar year } y}$$

where  $t$  is length of recidivism follow-up time and  $y$  is the release year.

The PA DOC has generally defined its benchmark recidivism follow-up period as three years after prison release. This follow-up period is generally recognized as an optimal follow-up period for capturing recidivism as a stable and reliable measure. In addition to three-year rates, this report also examines six-month and one-year rates, as well as at least one comparison of five-year rates.

In order to provide maximum insight into recidivism of inmates released from the PA DOC, data on arrests have been collected in addition to standard reincarceration data. Arrest data was used to calculate rearrest rates for released inmates. Many recidivism studies use multiple measures of recidivism, including rearrest and reincarceration rates.

Recidivism rates for Community Corrections Centers (CCCs) and Contract Facilities (CCFs) were only calculated for those who were paroled from prison to a Center. This report did not examine recidivism rates for Center residents who were in a Center for a technical parole violation (e.g., “halfway back” cases and TPV Center cases). Recidivism rates for pre-release offenders in Centers were not included either. To maximize comparability between those paroled to a Center and those paroled “to the street”, this report further only examined the sub-set of parole release cases who received a “parole to an approved home plan” Parole Board action, some who transitioned through a Center (i.e., the “Parole to Center” group) and others who were paroled directly home (i.e., the “Parole to Street” group). We think this is an important methodological improvement over previous attempts to evaluate recidivism rates for Pennsylvania’s CCCs and CCFs.

### Data Sources: Releases and Reincarceration Data

Reincarceration data for this report was extracted from PA DOC internal databases by the Bureau of Planning, Research and Statistics. The data used represents released inmates by release year. Demographic information (e.g., age, sex, race) and commitment data (e.g., primary offense type) was collected from release records. Only inmates released permanently were included- that is, the releases included all inmates whose incarceration sentence had been satisfied. This includes some inmates whose sentence involves a period of post-prison supervision.

### Data Sources: Rearrest Data

The Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) provided arrest data for this report. The PSP receives arrest reports from local police agencies within the state. Since arrest reports from local agencies are not mandated by law, this data may underreport actual arrests of released inmates. Computerized criminal history files drawn from this statewide database were used to provide arrest data to the PA DOC.

# 2013 PA RECIDIVISM REPORT

## Appendix B—End Notes

1. Rearrest and Overall Recidivism rates were not available for the 20-year time period
2. Metropolitan Areas as defined by the PA Department of Labor ([www.paworkstats.state.pa.us](http://www.paworkstats.state.pa.us)).
  - Allentown : Carbon, Lehigh, Northampton
  - Altoona: Blair
  - Erie: Erie
  - Harrisburg-Carlisle: Cumberland, Dauphin, Perry
  - Johnstown: Cambria
  - Lancaster: Lancaster
  - Lebanon: Lebanon
  - Philadelphia: Philadelphia, Delaware, Chester, Bucks, Montgomery
  - Pittsburgh: Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Washington, Westmoreland
  - Reading: Berks
  - Scranton-Wilkes-Barre: Lackawanna, Luzerne, Wyoming
  - State College: Centre
  - Williamsport: Lycoming
  - York-Hanover: York
3. Race/ethnicity categories are measured as mutually exclusive, according to the inmate's response upon entry into state prison.
4. Other race/ethnicity categories are not used in this report because they make up less than 1% of the releases in any given year.
5. Age groups are determined based on equal sizes of the inmates released in 2008.
6. The number of prior arrests and incarcerations were determined based on equal groupings of the inmates released in 2008.
7. Risk score based on the LSI-R assessment given upon entry into state prison. The **LSI-R™** assessment is a quantitative survey of offender attributes and offender situations relevant for assessing criminal risk of re-offending, and making decisions about levels of supervision and treatment. The instrument's applications include assisting in the allocation of resources, helping to make probation and placement decisions, making appropriate security level classifications, and assessing treatment progress. The 54 LSI-R items include relevant factors for making decisions about risk level and treatment.
8. Breakdown of Broad Crime Categories:
  - Violent—Murder/Manslaughter, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Other Assault, Statutory Rape, Other Sexual Offenses, Kidnapping
  - Property—Burglary, Theft/Larceny, Arson, Fraud, Stolen Property, Forgery
  - Drugs—Drug Offenses
  - Public Order/Other—Weapons, DUI, Prison Breach, Part II Other
9. Arrests according to 2010 Pennsylvania State Uniform Crime Report (PA State Police, 2012).
10. Part I crimes were only included in this analysis because some Part II crime, such as simple assaults, may not be fully reported to the Pennsylvania State Police.
11. Rates in Table 20 are per 100,000 population in Pennsylvania.
12. The complete set of controlled predictors consists of age at release, race, marital status, count of prior institutional misconducts, count of prior incarcerations, LSI-R score, violent commitment offense indicator committing county, sex offender indicator, status of completing prescribed institutional treatment, and time served in prison. The controlled predictors are set at their mean values.
13. The follow-up time of 1 year and 3 years includes the 6 months of recidivism-free time assumed for this analysis.

## **Study: Halfway houses a flop at rehabilitation**

The federal government and states across the country have spent billions of dollars in recent years on sprawling, privately run halfway houses, which are supposed to save money and rehabilitate inmates more effectively than prisons do.

But now, a study by officials in Pennsylvania is casting serious doubt on the halfway-house model, concluding that inmates who spent time in these facilities were more likely to return to crime than inmates who were released directly to the street.

The findings startled the administration of Gov. Tom Corbett, which responded last month by overhauling contracts with companies that run the 38 private halfway houses in Pennsylvania. The system costs more than \$110 million annually.

### ***'An abject failure'***

Pennsylvania's corrections secretary, John Wetzel, who oversaw the study, called the system "an abject failure."

"The focus has been on filling up beds," he said. "It hasn't been on producing good outcomes."

The state now plans to link payments to the companies to their success at rehabilitating the thousands of inmates who go through halfway houses in Pennsylvania annually.

The federal government and many states have increasingly sought to cut spending on corrections by relying on privately run halfway houses, many of which are as large as prisons.

The study by the Pennsylvania Corrections Department found that 67 percent of inmates sent to halfway houses were rearrested or sent back to prison within three years, compared with 60 percent of inmates who were released to the streets.

### ***Discouraging results***

The study examined 38 privately run and 14 state-run halfway houses. The results for both categories were discouraging, Wetzel said.

He said researchers had not pinpointed the reasons, but he said he suspected that some halfway houses were not providing adequate services.

"I did unannounced tours at every one," Wetzel said. "Sometimes I felt there wasn't enough structured activity, more idleness than I was comfortable with. We're not paying to let inmates watch Jerry Springer."



March 24, 2013

# Pennsylvania Study Finds Halfway Houses Don't Reduce Recidivism

By **SAM DOLNICK**

The federal government and states across the country have spent billions of dollars in recent years on sprawling, privately run halfway houses, which are supposed to save money and rehabilitate inmates more effectively than prisons do.

But now, a groundbreaking study by officials in Pennsylvania is casting serious doubt on the halfway-house model, concluding that inmates who spent time in these facilities were more likely to return to crime than inmates who were released directly to the street.

The findings startled the administration of Gov. Tom Corbett, which responded last month by drastically overhauling state contracts with the companies that run the 38 private [halfway houses in Pennsylvania](#). The system costs more than \$110 million annually.

Pennsylvania's [corrections secretary, John E. Wetzel](#), who oversaw the study, called the system "an abject failure."

"The focus has been on filling up beds," Mr. Wetzel said in an interview. "It hasn't been on producing good outcomes."

The state now plans to link payments to the companies to their success at rehabilitating the thousands of inmates who go through halfway houses in Pennsylvania annually.

Correctional experts said the move by Mr. Corbett, a Republican, made Pennsylvania a prominent voice in the national debate over whether new correctional strategies, including halfway houses, lowered recidivism rates and cut ballooning prison budgets.

By contrast, New Jersey, which has also been a leader in the halfway-house movement, has moved far more slowly to revamp its system, even though senior New Jersey lawmakers acknowledge that it is as troubled as Pennsylvania's.

The same company, [Community Education Centers](#), is the biggest provider of halfway houses in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

The New York Times published [a series of articles](#) last year that detailed [escapes, violence, drug use and other problems](#) at Community Education halfway houses in New Jersey.

Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey, a Republican, has been a vocal supporter of Community Education. Until November, [his close friend and political adviser William J. Palatucci](#) was a senior executive at the company.

Mr. Christie's chief spokesman, Michael Drewniak, said it was not proper to compare the systems in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

"I have no interest in assisting The New York Times if it is cherry-picking facts and figures, drawing conclusions from a Pennsylvania study and applying them erroneously to this state," Mr. Drewniak said.

But the Pennsylvania study was so conclusive that it dismayed even a criminologist who serves on Community Education's board of directors.

The criminologist, [Prof. Edward Latessa of the University of Cincinnati](#), said the study confirmed his own research on the Pennsylvania system, which has about 4,500 beds.

"We looked at quality indicators in our study," he said. "They were all poor. There were almost no positive results. I was shocked."

The federal government and many states have increasingly sought to cut spending on corrections by relying on privately run halfway houses, many of which are as large as prisons.

Inmates can be paroled or sent toward the end of their sentences to these facilities, where per-bed costs are generally two-thirds those of prisons. The companies promise to give the residents therapy, drug treatment, job training and other services to help ease their transition back to society.

The [study by the Pennsylvania Corrections](#) Department found that 67 percent of inmates sent to halfway houses were rearrested or sent back to prison within three years, compared with 60 percent of inmates who were released to the streets.

The study examined 38 privately run and 14 state-run halfway houses. The results for both categories were discouraging, said Mr. Wetzel, the state corrections chief.

He said researchers had not pinpointed the reasons, but he said he suspected that some halfway houses were not providing adequate services.

"I did unannounced tours at every one," Mr. Wetzel said. "Sometimes I felt there wasn't enough structured activity, more idleness than I was comfortable with. We're not paying to let inmates watch Jerry Springer."

Community Education has four halfway houses in Pennsylvania, with a total of 780 beds, and its recidivism rate was also 67 percent, like that of the overall halfway-house system, officials said. The company recently acquired another company in Pennsylvania with 581 beds.

The study included inmates who committed crimes while living in the halfway houses — on work-release programs, for example — or after they left.

In explaining why recidivism rates for halfway houses might be higher, Christopher Greeder, a spokesman for Community Education, said halfway-house inmates were under more scrutiny than prisoners released into the community. They were thus more likely to be detected when they break the law, he said.

"The Pennsylvania report is a landmark study that offers a complex look at the challenging issue of reducing recidivism," Mr. Greeder said in a prepared statement. "There are many excellent recommendations and constructive discussions of the multiple factors surrounding current procedures and about future benchmarks and performance standards."

Community Education runs six large facilities in New Jersey, with a total of 1,900 beds for state inmates and parolees, along with many hundreds more for county and federal inmates.

The state and counties in New Jersey spend more than \$100 million on halfway houses, but New Jersey officials have never examined how these programs may affect recidivism.

In 2011, the Christie administration commissioned a report on the issue that it said would be completed in 2014 or 2015.

At the same time, the New Jersey Legislature, which is controlled by Democrats, has moved slowly on several bills that would revamp the system.

The **TTNA EXHIBIT 28** [measure to establish a task force](#) to study the safety, security and effectiveness of halfway houses. The task force would deliver a final report in 2015.

Page 1 of 2  
Lawmakers acknowledged that they had created the task force because they did not fully understand the system, which is more than two decades old.

"The task force bill is viewed as a starting point," said the Assembly speaker, Sheila Y. Oliver, an Essex County Democrat. "Once we get that report, legislative fixes can then be considered."

The task force would include lawmakers of both parties, as well as the corrections commissioner, the chairman of the State Parole Board, and independent experts selected by legislative leaders.

Nancy Wolff, director of the [Center for Behavioral Health Services and Criminal Justice Research](#) at Rutgers University, who testified last year at legislative hearings on halfway houses, said the task force was a delaying tactic.

She said if New Jersey were serious, it would follow the lead of Pennsylvania and another state that effected major changes, Ohio.

"There are too many lives at risk and too many people who could benefit from reform to wait two years to institute change," Dr. Wolff said.




1977

## Testing the Functions and Effect of the Parole Halfway House: One Case Study

James A. II Beha

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## TESTING THE FUNCTIONS AND EFFECT OF THE PAROLE HALFWAY HOUSE: ONE CASE STUDY

JAMES A. BEHA, II\*

The halfway house has become the basic model for many of the new programs encompassed by the label "community corrections." Of the more than 250 current programs in the International Halfway House Association, over half did not exist in 1965. Thus, it is hardly an exaggeration to speak of an "explosion" in the halfway house field. Yet little research has been done on the effectiveness of such programs. This paper reports on a study of a Boston halfway house's clients over a seven year period.

The paper begins with an analysis of background data on clients, including trends over time, and makes comparisons to parallel data on the general parolee and releasee populations, where available. The second section of the paper presents data on length of stay and mode of termination, and attempts to relate these variables to background factors.

The final section of the paper describes a follow-up of the client group to determine the overall recidivism rate, and a comparison of that rate to the rate that might have been "predicted" for the group by using appropriate base expectancy tables.

"Halfway houses" include residential facilities with capacities from two or three to over fifty, and which provide services and treatment ranging from simple shelter to intensive therapeutic community. They focus on a number of social problems, only one of which is the ex-offender's difficult transition from prison to the community.<sup>1</sup> The most recent directory for the International Halfway House Association lists programs aimed at ex-offenders, parolees, probationers, juveniles, "youths," narcotics addicts and al-

coholics. In addition, the Association includes some mental health facilities. Programs dealing with alcoholics were extensively developed during the immediate post-World War II period,<sup>2</sup> and mental health and personal "crisis" houses began shortly thereafter. Halfway house programs for addicts date from the early 1950's and were expanded in the early 1960's.

While these focused halfway programs, like the network of casual residential programs (for example, YMCA's and hospitals), will accept ex-offenders, such clients may be only a small portion of their population. For example, in 1972 programs *not* tailored to ex-inmates received 40 per cent of the parole residential placements made in Massachusetts; yet none of these programs took more than five such placements during the full year.<sup>3</sup> While it can be argued that these mixed population houses make "reintegration" a fact from the start, they are equipped to deal with their residents only in terms of the primary focus of their programs. The parole and correctional halfway programs, by contrast, take *as* their primary focus the fact that clients have been—and may still be—in trouble with the law.

Historically, the basic elements in the halfway house program for the adult ex-inmate were the resources of residence: the house would provide shelter and support to those who lacked it. Later, with the advent of parole, access to such a program could balance the absence of community ties and thus make early release a possibility. Nevertheless, post-prison residence seems an opportunity only to a limited portion of those in prison; it is therefore not surprising that only a small percentage of those released from prison are served by halfway houses. To refer again to the Massachusetts experience: in 1972 only about 13 per cent of all parolees were required to accept a residential placement of any kind (placements were fewer than available beds)<sup>4</sup> and a

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This research was supported in part by funds from the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice.

<sup>1</sup> Among the works which provide useful discussion of the halfway house in its criminal justice applications are E. DOLESCHAL, *GRADUATED RELEASE* (Public Health Service Pub. No. 2128, 1971), also in *1 INFORMATION REVIEW ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY* 1 (1969); R. GOLDFARB & L. S. KELLER & B. O. KELLER, *CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTERED CORRECTION AND TREATMENT* (1970).

<sup>2</sup> Blacker & Kantor, *Halfway House for Problem Drinkers*, *FED. PROBATION* at 18 (June 1960).

<sup>3</sup> MASS. PAROLE BOARD, *REPORT ON 1972 RELEASES TO PAROLE SUPERVISION FROM MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS*, (April, 1973).

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*

study that same year concluded that only about 5 to 10 per cent of future releasees would "need" the residential structure of a halfway house.<sup>5</sup>

Why, then, the wide interest in the halfway house model and experience? The answer seems to be that the halfway house provides both an historical tradition and a model for a variety of programs now grouped as "community corrections", that is, programs which serve as an alternative or as a supplement to the more intensive deprivations of freedom presently characteristic of the detention and correction process.

Despite this widespread interest, the literature on halfway house programs—and particularly the evaluative literature—is spotty at best. After a review of all the available information on halfway programs,<sup>6</sup> this author decided to take a closer look at one particular program which seemed a fair test of the parole halfway house concept, and which was plainly having a major impact as a model for state correctional programs. Explicitly, then, this program was chosen because it was *atypical*. Most important—and most unusual—was the willingness of the program's administrators to cooperate with a candid "impact evaluation" effort.

Brooke House, operated in Boston by Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Inc., has been in existence since 1965. The house appears to be well-run, and has a national reputation for the high quality of the training which staff members receive. The operational philosophy of the House—reality therapy—is much in vogue throughout the American correctional network. The parole program at Brooke House was well respected by the Parole Board, and was utilized almost completely for most of the period studied.<sup>7</sup> For all these reasons, Brooke House would appear to be an appropriate example of the well-developed correctional halfway house model, and an appropriate test of the utility of the parole halfway house model, at least for programs with similar operating philosophies.

<sup>5</sup>Cohen, *A Study of Community-Based Correctional Needs in Massachusetts* (Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, 1973).

<sup>6</sup>Beha, *Halfway Houses in Adult Corrections: The Law, Practice, and Results*, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 434 (1975).

<sup>7</sup>The research here must be *post hoc* both because we want to cover client flow from the start of the program in order to obtain an adequate number of cases (and in order to parallel the House's own research) and because Brooke House ITTNA EXHIBIT 29 rather than a parole, follow-up period, the sample stops with clients entering in 1972.

## CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH

### *Introduction to Brooke House*

Since its inception in late 1965 Brooke House has taken placements from federal correctional institutions on pre-release status, as well as parolees from the state system. Referrals from other sources (county houses of correction and "the street") average about 15 per cent of total admissions.<sup>8</sup> Financial support for the House's operation has come from federal and state contracts, private contributions, and the earnings of residents (a portion of which is applied toward room and board).

Throughout its existence Brooke House has utilized the modality known as "reality therapy."<sup>9</sup> In contrast to some other techniques, reality therapy does not directly attack the client's norms, nor does it push for "insights" into past behavior and motivations. Rather, the counsellor and client are expected to concentrate on specifying the client's set of current and potential life-needs and the possible non-criminal avenues to their achievement. Brooke House particularly emphasizes job placement, work habits and sound financial planning. This latter point includes the proper use of savings; in this connection, Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Inc. operates.

the only Federal Credit Union ever chartered specifically to serve ex-offenders. The major purpose of the Credit Union is to provide ex-offenders with an opportunity to re-establish a credit rating in the community.<sup>10</sup>

Brooke House's administrators report that "the program was designed for chronic offenders with long periods of incarceration and few community resources."<sup>11</sup> As a result, the program begins in a highly structured format and moves toward greater freedom for the individual resident as the House staff concludes that he has accepted greater accountability and involvement.

### *The Present Research Effort*

Brooke House has sponsored several "internal" studies of recidivism among former clients,<sup>12</sup> in

<sup>8</sup>MASSACHUSETTS HALFWAY HOUSES, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (1972) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].

<sup>9</sup>W. GLASSER, REALITY THERAPY (1965).

<sup>10</sup>ANNUAL REPORT, *supra* note 8.

<sup>11</sup>Interview with house director (Spring 1973).

<sup>12</sup>MASSACHUSETTS HALFWAY HOUSES, INC., BROOKE HOUSE RESEARCH: TWO YEAR RECIDIVISM STUDY (May 1972); Runyan, *Evaluation of a Correctional Halfway House*, (unpublished study prepared for Brooke House, September 1970); J. PLECK, S. SIMON, & J. B. RILEY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A CORRECTIONAL HALFWAY HOUSE (1969).

addition to annual reports which have included data on background and length of stay. Each of these reports has covered all types of House clients (federal, state, county, and "street").

The focus of the present report is different in several respects. First, it is limited to clients who came directly to the House on parole from Massachusetts state correctional facilities. Second, for all information other than length of stay at the House and mode of termination, this study is based on data files maintained and verified by the Department of Correction and the Board of Paroles.<sup>13</sup> Last, the report covers seven full years of client-flow, providing cumulative as well as period-specific analyses.

The first of these differences—limiting the report to parolees from Massachusetts state correctional institutions—requires further explanation. For analytical purposes, both this author and the research sponsors wanted to isolate the character and impact of the House as a *parole* halfway facility from its function as a *pre-release* center. Our concern was not merely with the logical aspect of this distinction, but also with the operational and selection differences which were necessarily at work (for example, the difference between the direct custodial control possible at a pre-release stage and the much more indirect control which is predicated on the ultimate threat of parole revocation).<sup>14</sup>

The second reason for this limitation was more pragmatic: an important part of the analysis was to be the evaluation of recidivism rates among former clients. But realistic appraisals only make sense as comparisons. The Massachusetts Department of Correction periodically prepares Base Expectancy Tables which, under proper constraints, may provide a standard of comparison for state parolees. No comparable tool exists for county parolees released prior to 1972, and the only tables available for the federal system at the time this study was undertaken were so old that one could not justify reliance on them in a research setting.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, data on individuals released from state institutions was accessible, albeit with effort. Files on county house of correction inmates are scattered, fragmented, and not always comparable. Background and follow-up data on federal placements is, unfortunately, very difficult to obtain.

<sup>13</sup>Data was made available under a plan for maintaining confidentiality which was approved by the Criminal History Systems Board. Thanks are due to a number of persons for their assistance; see note 30 and accompanying text.

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<sup>15</sup>*Corrections: The BULL.* 434 (1975).

We have therefore limited the report to those incarcerated in the state system,<sup>16</sup> although the house in operation is very much a "mixed bag." Internal research by the Brooke House staff indicates that the federal and state placements do in fact differ in several respects, such as age, and the staff suggests that the "leavening" effect of this mixture is a noticeable element in the therapeutic milieu.

#### THE BROOKE HOUSE CLIENT

It would be superfluous in a report of this scope to present all the background information analyzed for this study. But we should attempt a "modal profile" of the Brooke House state parole client:

The client is white, Catholic, unmarried, and from Boston. He has no military experience [if he does, he has an honorable discharge]. He is unskilled and worked irregularly; he has completed some high school. He was 16 at his first conviction, and has accumulated nine convictions, mostly for property crimes. He had been incarcerated three times before the current sentence, serving over two years, and has been on both juvenile and adult parole; he has also been on adult probation. He pled guilty to his present offense, for which he had no co-defendants, and served approximately 22 months for that offense. He was between 25 and 26 years old at release.

Over the time period studied in this report most of the background characteristics of the Brooke House population remained relatively constant. While there were some changes in the background of the clients served between the mid-1960's and those in the early 1970's, on only four background items was the change substantial and statistically significant. There was a decline in the number and length of prior adult incarcerations at the county (misdemeanor and minor felony) level, and a related increase in the proportion of clients who had experienced adult probation. (There were, however, no sizeable shifts in the total number of prior offenses or in the number or length of incarcerations at the level of the state prison system.) Those in the program during 1971-1972 were less likely to have been returned to prison previously for the violation of a parole.

The proportion of participants who described themselves as Catholics showed a significant decline.

<sup>16</sup>There were 256 such clients from 1965-1972. No data could be located in the Department of Corrections files on 11 clients (4 per cent). Ninety-five per cent of these clients were parolees. An additional five 1969-1972 cases were "lost" in developing base expectancy scores due to insufficient information.

Finally—and most importantly in terms of the operating milieu of the House—by 1971–1972 there was a marked increase in the proportion of clients whose records included arrests for narcotics offenses.

Our statistical analysis revealed that the likelihood of recidivism among Brooke House clients was related both to involvement with narcotics and to the number of county incarcerations. Neither relationship is particularly strong and, since they oppose each other in terms of their significance for the changing character of the client population, it seems safe to conclude that the 1971–1972 population was quite similar to that of 1965–1968 in terms of their “recidivism threat.”

We had available comparable data on 1971 releasees from state correctional institutions for thirty-five of our background variables and we had data on 1972 parolees that were comparable on eleven items. As a somewhat incomplete summary of the more extensive comparison available to us, that with the 1971 releasee group, we note:

The Brooke House client was less likely to be married, to have a skill or a stable work record, to be involved with narcotics, or to have been released from Walpole. He was more likely to have been committed for a sex-related offense, or for a robbery that included the use of a weapon. The client had somewhat less education. He was more likely to come from Boston, to have a military record and an honorable discharge, and to come from MCI Concord.

We should stress that since Brooke House drew almost exclusively from the parolee, rather than releasee, population, these mixed comparisons tend

to understate the seriousness of the prior criminal record of Brooke House clients. On those few variables for which we have comparable data on parolees, Brooke House clients clearly show up as having much more serious than average records. For example, the typical parolee had served less time in prison for his current offense before gaining his parole than had the Brooke House client, who had gained a far more restricted release. Brooke House clients had also been incarcerated more often in the past, particularly in juvenile and county-level adult facilities.

Despite these differences in criminal records, the comparison between Brooke House and other releasee populations most clearly establishes that the process by which inmates came to be conditionally paroled to the House was primarily attuned to the candidate's social background and to the character of his present offense, rather than to the details of his prior criminal history. A straightforward concern that the defendant would be arrested for a new crime after his release seems to have been less significant than a concern with the *kind* of offense involved and a perception that the delivery of social services and structured support might be appropriate for this offender. (The fact that this somewhat limited data set is able to pick up distinctions consistent with this analysis gives us some encouragement in employing a statistical approach to “control” for these kinds of biases when examining the client group's recidivism.)

#### PROGRAM PARTICIPATION

The bulk of Brooke House state admissions were parolees (96 per cent), of whom 92 per cent

TABLE 1  
TIME AT BROOKE HOUSE FOR PAROLEE CLIENTS 1965–1968 AND 1969–1972; BREAKDOWN BY WHETHER  
“COMPLETED” PROGRAM

Group	Avg Time	Std Deviation*
All Parolees (N = 235)	82.4 days	66.6
Parolees 1965–1968 (N = 86)	102.9 days	86.8
Parolees 1969–1972 (N = 149)	70.5 days	31.6
All Parolees “completing” (N = 115)	112.7 days	68.8
1965–1968 Parolees “completing” (N = 35)	155.1 days	104.9
1969–1972 Parolees “completing” (N = 80)	94.1 days	31.0
All Parolees “not complete” (N = 120)	53.4 days	49.4
1965–1968 Parolees “not complete” (N = 51)	67.2 days	63.9
1969–1972 Parolees “not complete” (N = 69)	43.2 days	32.3

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within this range around the average.

remained at the House beyond the first week. About half of this group was reported as "completing" the program; that is, when they did leave, it was with the approval of the staff. Data on length of stay at Brooke House are presented in Table 1, where the data are broken down by time period and by whether or not the client was reported as completing the program.

The author wanted to determine which background variables distinguish those parolees who "split" at once from the program from those who remained for at least a week. A variety of differences were found which pointed to two underlying factors. First, the less extensive the parolee's prior involvement with the prison system, the more likely he was to remain. Second, but closely related, the less extensive the client's prior involvement with *petty* crime, the more likely he was to remain.

These same factors continued to be related to the likelihood that those who remained beyond the first week would eventually complete the program. These findings are consistent with a rather intriguing interpretation of the House process. Most Brooke House clients have had substantial prison experience. What is significant, it would seem, is not the *length* of imprisonment, but the *number* of times imprisoned. Program administrators agree that the inmate who has done a few long stretches of "hard" time survives well in the structured Brooke House environment. The inmate who has been in and out of prison on a series of less serious offenses is less likely *ever* to have adjusted to structure, and is quite likely to find the Brooke House environment unsatisfactory.

Our analysis revealed several important time trends concerning participation in the program and whether or not clients were rated as completing the program. These may be summarized as follows:

The average number of days spent in the program declined steadily over time—from 102 to 80 to 64.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, however, the rate at which clients were reported as having completed the program increased substantially in 1969–70, though it receded somewhat in 1971–72. A similar curvilinear trend was apparent for the proportion of clients completing at least a week at the program.

The fact that clients in the 1969–1972 period were surviving in the program, leaving on positive terms, and thereby retaining their parole beyond the condi-

tional stage correlates with the fact that the later group was substantially more successful in avoiding a return to the state prison than were clients in the 1965–1968 group. Figure 1 gives the month-by-month results, and confirms the widely held perception that the first year of release is the critical period for recidivism. What this figure cannot tell us, of course, is whether the sharp drop in returns to prison is connected to some element in the Brooke House program, or was experienced by the general population of those released from the prison system. Nor, of course, can these figures give us any indication whether these sorts of clients would not have shown about the same performance without the assistance of a halfway placement. The sections which follow attempt to respond to these concerns.

#### MEASURING PROGRAM IMPACT

##### *Defining "Success"*

"Success" for criminal justice programs is generally defined in terms of a net effect on the crime rate. For correctional programs, the measure of success is typically narrowed to the recidivism rate for participants although, in theory, correctional programs might also affect criminal behavior through the potential offender's perception of the type of punishment with which he is being threatened. Analytically, an effect on recidivism is the product of the interaction between specific deterrence and rehabilitation.<sup>18</sup>

Occasionally, other standards are introduced, including the "justness" (proportionality?) of a particular treatment and the relation of a program to various civil rights—most frequently to "due process of law." Cost and operational control are also often considered. It remains true, however, that "effectiveness" is most frequently stated in terms of subsequent behavior patterns.

It is sometimes argued that recidivism is an inadequate standard because the correctional goal is properly one of rehabilitation—of which recidivism is but one element.<sup>19</sup> This position is, of course,

<sup>18</sup> Stated for the individual, rehabilitation of the actor occurs when an opportunity for a sustained noncriminal lifestyle is utilized; stated in program-action terms, rehabilitation is the effect of programs in instigating and shaping individual change. Stated practically—given the researcher's access only to arrest and conviction information—what is perceived as rehabilitation may be a matured skill at avoiding apprehension.

<sup>19</sup> E.g., Woodring, *A Dilemma: Rehabilitation and Its Relationship to Recidivism*, 22 YOUTH AUTHORITY QUARTERLY 3 (1969).

**Figure 1:** Patterns of Recidivism for Brooke House Clients, 1965-1968 Group and 1969-1972 Group




FIGURE 1

linked to the "professional treatment" model of corrections perceptively critiqued by Francis Allen and more recently assessed in *Struggle for Justice*.<sup>20</sup>

The point to be made in response to the social-rehabilitative approach is not that social services are

irrelevant to the reduction of recidivism nor that they should not be available for their own sake within correctional programs as well as elsewhere. Rather the terms of the criminal justice system's mandate must be stressed: the correctional process is necessarily and fundamentally intrusive and coercive, and the exercise of that intrusive power is justified in terms of the punishment and prevention of criminal behavior. It is inconsistent with that mandate to structure a "rehabilitation" regime which is not judged in terms of its effect on criminal behavior. The problem is not merely that such cross-purposes undermine and often unduly extend the correctional process (although they may),<sup>21</sup> but that, fundamentally, no "right" has been—or can be—granted to exercise that kind of dominion.

This brief response can hardly do justice either to the complex arguments or to the depth of professional and ideological feelings which are involved in

<sup>20</sup> Allen, *Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal*, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 228 (1959); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, *STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA* (1971). See also Lehman, *The Medical Model of Treatment*, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 204 (1972); Shorer, "Experts" and *Diagnosis in Correctional Agencies*, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 347 (1974). One important, though not logically essential, element in the critique of the rehabilitative approach to criminal conduct is the continuing inability of professional caseworkers to predict subsequent individual criminality with any substantial accuracy. Cf. N. MORRIS, *THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT* 66-72 (1974); P. MEEHL, *CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION* (1957); BUREAU OF REHABILITATION, *REPORT ON SHAW RESIDENCE, MARCH 1964-MARCH 1968* at 81 (1968), which noted "the lack of any correlation at all

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with the  
full institutional file," [hereinafter cited as SHAW REPORT].

<sup>21</sup> Comment, *Pretrial Diversion: The Threat of Expanding Social Control*, 10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 180 (1975).



determining *what* the function of criminal justice is to be. It should, however, explain why the present investigation is limited to a quantifiable, if far from perfect, measure of subsequent criminal behavior and why it does not report on "personal growth," "employability," or "response to peer pressure."

### *The Standard of Comparison Employed*

There are a variety of technical reasons why it is rather difficult to evaluate the impact of halfway house programs on recidivism. The first of these is that researchers will have real problems defining and following up an adequate *comparison group*.<sup>22</sup>

Where a control group design is not available, there are a number of statistical techniques, such as matching, multiple regression, and successive dichotomization (base expectancy), which may be used to adjust comparisons between groups which, in fact, are not precisely comparable, for example, clients at Brooke House compared to all other Massachusetts parolees. These techniques rely on the data available for both groups, examine that data to discern relationships between background variables and recidivism, and then adjust the comparison for specific differences *known* to be related to recidivism.

No matter how completely the available concrete data is adjusted, there can still remain some dynamic differences of uncertain consequence between the placements at the program and the general parolee group:

[R]esidents of a halfway house which is an independent agency . . . are by that very fact an unrepresentative group of offenders. They come to the program if they *want to* or because some one else makes the judgment that they *need to*.<sup>23</sup>

On the one hand, halfway house applicants might be expected to lack community and family ties—factors not directly assessed in the available background data

files. On the other hand, halfway house selection processes may emphasize those who are perceived as "ready to change," another factor not likely to be available in the data base.<sup>24</sup> While Brooke House screeners refused to accept those who showed no interest at all in active participation, they rarely turned away applicants on any other basis, except during those few short periods when the House was oversubscribed.

The present statistical analysis is based on the successive dichotomization, or base expectancy, technique. The Massachusetts Department of Correction (D.O.C.) periodically studies the criminal history records of those paroled from state institutions during particular years, in an effort to specify the *rate* and *patterns* of recidivism.<sup>25</sup> Such a study was done for those paroled in 1966, using a follow-up period of two years after release. A recent D.O.C. study has been completed which does a similar analysis for 1971 parolees, using a one-year follow-up. Chart 1 is an example of the result: for parolees released from Walpole in 1966, this chart most accurately describes the patterns of recidivism over the next two years. Further, once these predictive patterns have been traced out, there are no other vari-

<sup>24</sup>Of course, whether either the parole boards or the houses are correct in a particular case—or even in the aggregate—is an empirical question; there is some evidence to suggest that their judgments do not improve on the base expectancy scores generated from the "hard" data. Berecucha & Sing, *The Effectiveness of a Halfway House for Civilly Committed Narcotics Addicts*, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ADDICTIONS (Spring 1972); see also the sources cited at note 20, *supra*.

<sup>25</sup>See, e.g., LeClair, *An Analysis of Recidivism Among Residents Released from Massachusetts Correctional Institutions During 1971* (Massachusetts Dep't of Corrections, May 1975); Graves, *An Analysis of Recidivism Among Men Released from M.C.I. Norfolk During 1966* (Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, August 1972); Carney, *Predicting Recidivism in a Medium Security Correctional Institution: Base Expectancy Categories for M.C.I. Norfolk* (Massachusetts Dep't of Corrections, June 1966); Metzner & Weil, *Predicting Recidivism: Base Rates for Massachusetts Correctional Institution Concord*, 54 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 307 (1963). The technique presently in use essentially attempts to maximize the chi square of variables tabulated against recidivism, across all possible dichotomies for each independent variable. The variable with the greatest "predictive force" is chosen, and then the process is repeated within each new cell until no further significant chi squares will emerge. Cf. F. SIMON, PREDICTION METHODS IN CRIMINOLOGY (1971); D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1969); Babst, Gottfredson & Ballard, *A Comparison of Multiple Regression and Configurational Analysis Techniques for Developing Base Expectancy Tables*, 5 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 72 (1968).

<sup>22</sup>While the evaluator's clear preference will be for a random design ("controlled experiment"), he is extremely unlikely to get it, for several reasons: (1) a random design must be clearly constructed at the start of the program period and rigorously complied with throughout; (2) halfway houses are seldom so oversubscribed that they are prepared to turn away about half of the suitable applicants; and (3) most program personnel, like other social activists, see their programs as a definite improvement on the system and not as an experiment—they are unwilling to deny their pro-TTNA EXHIBIT 29 to allocate scarce

Chart 1

BASE EXPECTANCY OF RECIDIVISM CATEGORIES FOR WALPOLE			RETURN RATE		
TOTAL WALPOLE RELEASEES DURING 1966 N= 194  45.4% Return	10 OR FEWER PRIOR ARRESTS N= 107 32.7% Return	RESIDENCE PRIOR TO COMMITMENT OTHER THAN BOSTON N= 61 21.3% Return	SERVED IN ARMED FORCES	N= 31	6.5% CATEGORY I
			NEVER SERVED IN ARMED FORCES	N= 30	36.7% CATEGORY II
		RESIDENCE PRIOR TO COMMITMENT BOSTON N= 46 47.1% Return	2 OR FEWER PRIOR ARRESTS FOR PROPERTY OFFENSES	N= 17	29.4% CATEGORY III
			3 OR MORE PRIOR ARRESTS FOR PROPERTY OFFENSES	N= 29	58.6% CATEGORY IV
	11 OR MORE PRIOR ARRESTS N= 87 60.9% Return	SERVED IN ARMED FORCES N= 37 43.2% Return	3 OR FEWER PRIOR HOUSE OF CORRECTION INCARCERATIONS	N= 21	28.6% CATEGORY V
			4 OR MORE PRIOR HOUSE OF CORRECTION INCARCERATIONS	N= 16	62.5% CATEGORY VI
		NEVER SERVED IN ARMED FORCES N= 50 74.0% Return	33 OR OLDER AT COMMITMENT	N= 21	52.4% CATEGORY VII
			32 OR YOUNGER AT COMMITMENT	N= 29	89.7% CATEGORY VIII

CHART 2

CALCULATION OF AN AGGREGATED "RISK FACTOR" FOR A HYPOTHETICAL SAMPLE FROM WALPOLE

Category*	Category Weight	Hypothetical Sample**	"Risk Weight"
I	.065	13	.845
II	.367	15	5.505
III	.294	8	2.352
IV	.586	14	8.204
V	.286	13	3.718
VI	.625	10	6.250
VII	.524	17	8.908
VIII	.897	20	17.940
			53.722

$$\frac{53.722 \text{ "Risk Weight"}}{100 \text{ Men}} = 53.7\% \text{ expected rate of recidivism}$$

higher recidivism rating than that for the Walpole population as a whole (45.4%).

\* Refer to Chart 1 to determine the appropriate category, based on the stated background factors.

\*\* The breakdown was artificially created; in a real calculation, of course, this would be defined by the data.

ables in the data file which will significantly improve the ability to specify patterns of recidivism.

In the analysis which follows, the Brooke House clients entering between 1965 and 1968 are compared to the two-year research on D.O.C. 1966 releasees, and the 1969-1972 clients are compared to the one-year follow-up research on 1971 releasees. While the use of two different comparisons adds a complication to the work (a complication compounded by the fact that each study requires a different follow-up period), it also avoids the troublesome issue of noncontemporary comparisons. As it turns out, this is a significant advantage, since Parole Board policy on revocations showed some clear changes between the 1966 and the 1971 release cohorts.

One can think of the recidivism rate attached to each pattern as a "predictor score" for individuals who fit the pattern; the scores for each member of a particular group of parolees can then be aggregated, and a "statistical risk factor" or "expected recidivism rate" achieved for that group.<sup>26</sup> One such hypothetical calculation, for a "sample" of 100 men distributed randomly among the various risk categories, is demonstrated in Chart 2.

A tailored baseline such as the one computed in Chart 2 can then be used as an adjusted, constructed "comparison" against which the actual behavior of the sample can be assessed. Chi square or other standard tests may be used to interpret statistically the significance of any difference between the actual pattern observed and the pattern predicted on the basis of the expectancy table.

A second obstacle in the structuring of an "impact" evaluation comes in the specification of an appropriate indicator for recidivism. The problem is two-fold: one wants an indicator which one is confident is related to the underlying realities of criminal behavior; one also wants an indicator which will have the same meaning for both the comparison group and the sample being studied. The choice here was predetermined by the reliance placed on the Massachusetts Department of Correction's existing base expectancy research.

In its analyses, the Department of Correction defines recidivism as reincarceration for a period in excess of thirty days, commencing during the follow-up period. This reincarceration can come from a new

commitment, from a revocation of parole based on a new arrest, or from a revocation based on a "technical" violation of parole.<sup>27</sup> One form of such technical violation is the violation of a condition of parole; for example, leaving a residential placement without staff approval.

This is both a difficult aspect of analyzing program recidivism data and a significant issue, since 22 per cent of Brooke House reimprisonments were based on a technical violation. (This type of revocation was highest in the early years of the program, and had dropped substantially by the 1971-1972 period.) While a technical violation is *not* a new crime, it can hardly be assumed that those whose parole was revoked on technical grounds would otherwise never have been reimprisoned. Further, absconding can be viewed as a form of "program failure"—at least, once the client has become a program participant.<sup>28</sup> The problems which the technical revocation creates for an analysis of the crime-reducing effect of a halfway house are handled in the discussion section by a series of alternate assumptions. As it turns out, none of those assumptions would alter the overall conclusion.

The third barrier faced in attempting to do research on program impact on recidivism is the absence of data and the difficulty of obtaining existing data. The full cooperation of the program being studied is absolutely essential, and the author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of Brooke House and of Bryan Riley, the Director of Massachusetts Halfway Houses, Inc. But in order to get criminal histories data—and the critical comparison data—much more is necessary. The author is especially grateful, therefore, to the Department of Correction and its research staff both for allowing access to data,<sup>29</sup> and for sharing the results of their own research on recidivism.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup>The imperfection of any measure of recidivism is clearly recognized throughout the literature; the author was constrained here to adopt the measure used in the recidivism tables, a measure which does have the virtues of accuracy and a focus on more serious violative conduct.

<sup>28</sup>Five per cent of those paroled to Brooke House, however, remained there less than forty-eight hours.

<sup>29</sup>Pursuant to a plan for preserving the confidentiality of information, approved by the state's Criminal History Systems Board, Department of Correction, and Parole Board.

<sup>30</sup>Even cooperation is not enough: it took more than four months after the research design was completed to obtain the necessary clearances for access to the data files. Collecting the data then required over two hundred hours of work by Helene Whittaker, assisted by Gerry Bryant and Betty Farrell. Even so the analysis then had to be postponed another six months until the necessary comparison data on the 1971 parolees was available.

<sup>26</sup>It must be remembered that these are really aggregate predTTNA EXHIBIT 29  
chanremely high error  
factors. See generally, Ball, *The Element of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof*, 14 VAND. L. R. 807, 810 (1961).

TABLE 2  
REIMPRISONMENT RATES FOR THOSE PAROLED TO BROOKE HOUSE  
N = number returning to prison out of total number paroled to Brooke House

	All Clients	Clients Who "Split"	Clients Who "Stayed"	Clients Who "Completed"	Clients Who Stayed But Failed To "Complete"	
1965-1968 Clients N = ( )	52.3% (45 of 86)	80.0% (8 of 10)	48.7% (37 of 76)	23.0% (8 of 35)	70.7% (29 of 41)	Two year follow-up
1969-1972 Clients N = ( )	30.9% (46 of 149)	37.5% (3 of 8)	30.1% (43 of 141)	14.0% (11 of 80)	52.5% (32 of 61)	One year follow-up

Note: "Splitting" was defined as remaining at the program for less than one week. Whether or not the client had "completed" the program at the time he left was determined from notations in the program journal.

### Patterns of Recidivism

Roughly half of the 1965-1968 clients were reincarcerated during the two years they were followed; roughly a third of those in the 1969-1972 group were returned to prison during the year after their conditional parole to Brooke House (Figure 1). For those rated as completing the program the recidivism rates are much lower: 23 per cent of the two-year group and 14 per cent for the one-year group.

The first cohort also showed substantial differences in recidivism between those who stayed in the program for at least a week and those who "split" at once (Table 2). This pattern is not apparent for 1969-1972 clients, apparently because the Parole Board was no longer almost automatically revoking the parole of "early splits." (Remaining at Brooke House until rated a "completion" was, after all, the condition set for the parole.)

Our analysis found relatively few variables which discriminated between recidivists and nonrecidivists at Brooke House. The associations can be summarized as follows:

The individual admitted to Brooke House who is most likely to make a success of his parole is somewhat older, did a longer stretch (and was more likely to serve it at the State Prison); while he had more convictions as an adult (but not more overall time incarcerated at the state/federal level), he had less of a juvenile and county-level record. He is more likely to have been sentenced after a trial. He is perhaps more likely to come from outside Boston, to have been married at the time he was incarcerated, and to have had a longer period of time in the program. He has a lower risk of returning to prison after release from Brooke House, and is quite likely to have left as a "completion."

On all other background and institutional variables gathered by this study, the individual who was reincarcerated did not differ substantially from the individual who successfully finished out the follow-up period.

Many of these factors are relevant to recidivism because they are relevant to whether or not the client completes the program, and completing the program, in turn, is highly relevant to recidivism. If the focus is narrowed to consider only those parolees who completed the Brooke House program, a somewhat different pattern of association can be discerned:

The individual who completes the Brooke House program and then is more likely to make a success of his remaining parole [first, the stronger trends] did not have a record of drug use, and may have done some time in departmental segregation; moreover [weaker trends] he was more likely to have come from outside Boston, and to have held a job for a longer period of time.

Whether these particular variables define categories of offenders upon which the program has a "differential impact," or whether they merely reflect relationships which exist among the general releasee population can be analyzed using the base expectancy technique outlined above to control the comparison between client recidivism and the recidivism patterns among the full releasee groups of 1966 and 1971.

### The Comparative Results

Table 3 sets out the comparison between the actual reimprisonment rates for the 1965-1968 and

TABLE 3

RECIDIVISM RATES FOR BROOKE HOUSE CLIENTS COMPARED TO RATES PREDICTED FOR THEM FROM DEP'T OF CORRECTION BASE EXPECTANCY TABLES

	Rate Predicted from B.E. Table	Group's Recidivism Rate	
1965-1968 Clients	53.4%	52.3%	N = 86; two year follow-up
1969-1972 Clients	23.1%	30.1%	N = 144*; one year follow-up

\* Five cases were lost in the calculation of 1969-1972 base expectancy rates due to inadequate information on essential predictor variables. Two of these clients had been reimprisoned during the follow-up period, and three had not.

TABLE 4

RECIDIVISM AND PREDICTED RECIDIVISM FOR BROOKE HOUSE CLIENTS, BY YEAR

	Rate Predicted from B.E. Tables	Group's Recidivism Rate	Number of Clients Received That Year
1965-1968 Clients*	50% (est.)	49%	86
1969 Clients	22%	31%	29
1970 Clients	21%	34%	35
1971 Clients	25%	37%	35
1972 Clients	25%	22%	45

\* For the first year only; the predicted rate is based on the proportion of Brooke House total two-year recidivism which had occurred by the end of one-year of follow-up.

1969-1972 Brooke House clients and the rates which had been predicted for them. In a sample of this size, the sorts of differences displayed in Table 3 should be expected as a result of sampling fluctuations, and should not be attributed to any characteristic of the program.

One important result (Figure 1 and Table 4) is the sharp drop in the level of recidivism between the 1965-1968 and the 1969-1972 sample groups, and the further dramatic drop for 1972 clients. The 1972 rate is significantly lower than that of clients in the three preceding years despite the fact that the predicted rate ("risk rating") for the group is actually slightly higher. This drop is consistent with the informal perception of those within the Massachusetts Department of Correction that the 1972 group was "technical" where only a "technical" violation, and not a new arrest, is in-

volved. A particularly sharp shift came in late 1972 or early 1973, apparently as a response to overcrowding within the prison system. It is precisely these sorts of changes which limit the validity of any base expectancy model as a research comparison tool; had the 1966 model been used on the entire client group, a very strong "effect" would have been produced. Such a spurious "effect" would in fact be only a reflection of a change over time which occurred throughout the system and which affected both participants and nonparticipants equally.<sup>31</sup>

The fact that a client has been adjudged a "program completion" is, as previously noted, strongly related to his ability to survive the follow-up period without reimprisonment. This remains true even if the analysis eliminates all cases in which the parole of a noncompleting client was immediately revoked as a result of his having left the program. The effect is not dissipated when base expectancy ratings are factored in, as Table 5 demonstrates for the 1969-1972 group. The texture of this result is rather interesting: some of those who leave the program without permission have parole revoked at once; noncompleters who survive this point perform about as the expectancy tables might have predicted. Beyond the very real threat that parole will be revoked for a violation of the residential condition, there is no "failure effect" at Brooke House. There is, however, a distinct "success effect" for those who do complete the program. *When the success effects for both the 1965-1968 and 1969-1972 clients who*

<sup>31</sup> Thus, use of these tables to evaluate patterns of recidivism for releases in 1972, 1973 and succeeding years will be increasingly suspect, and likely to generate an illusory "program effect." Cf. LeClair, *An Analysis of Recidivism Among Residents Released from Boston State and Shirley Pre-Release Centers During 1972-73* (Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, August 1975) [hereinafter cited as LeClair].



thought of as forms of "early warning" to the Parole Board that he is an extremely bad risk for the immediate future. In that case, reincarceration for the remainder of the period would "save" crime that would otherwise be committed. Since reducing *crime*, rather than reducing *reimprisonment*, is the goal of the correctional program, the data might be re-analyzed, a bit ingenuously, to give Brooke House "credit" for preventing new-crime recidivism in each case where an improper exit from the program was followed by parole revocation for that reason.

Even this version of the analysis does not produce a net positive effect for the program, although it does point to a further important characteristic of the client group's pattern of recidivism: many of those who are returned to prison are arrested while still in residence, for crimes they have committed while residents of Brooke House. That is what "in program failure" is all about, both at Brooke House and at pre-release programs. The difference is that the Brooke House program, because it operates at the parole stage, must take responsibility for this sort of failure by having it recorded as an instance of "recidivism." The pre-release program, by contrast, dismisses such returns to prison as "in program failure," and insists that the program must be judged only in terms of those who are paroled from it; that is, who are program-completers. This study's analysis of Brooke House completions demonstrates that on such terms Brooke House is *also* a successful screening program. Why a crime which occurs immediately *before* a parole date should be denominated a "screening success," while a crime which occurs the day *after* parole is called a "negative outcome," remains unexplained in current research on pre-release programs.<sup>32</sup>

2) *Unmeasured selection factors.* The first section of this article sets out a number of differences between Brooke House clients and others who were given either parole or a straight release. The base expectancy methodology has been developed precisely for the purpose of adjusting comparisons to account for such differences insofar as they are relevant to the dependent variable (here, recidivism). Once the base expectancy factors specified by the Department of Correction are taken into account, there are no other variables in the data set available to us which would further affect the prediction of recidivism. The fact that Brooke House clients differ from the general population in a number of known

population's release experience in formulating a baseline against which the program's effect might be measured.<sup>33</sup>

To the degree that the Parole Board was responding to variables reflected in the data set in requiring a conditional placement at Brooke House, this research design fully controls for the differences between the Brooke House and general parole populations. To the degree that the Board was responding to variables not adequately correlated with our data, the design is still methodologically sufficient except insofar as those additional factors are *highly* correlated with recidivism.

The methodology applied, however, cannot preclude the logical possibility that the Parole Board is responding to still other "soft" factors which (1) are not accounted for by the risk rating and (2) are not substantially correlated with any variable in our data set, insofar as they are substantially correlated with increasing recidivism. To the degree that this seems possible, it may still be argued that Brooke House clients are "specially handicapped" in some way not adjusted for by the base expectancy computation and that a recidivism rate which matches the predicted score is actually a very successful outcome. While that alternative interpretation has no substantive basis anywhere in this research, it is unlikely ever to be totally ruled out unless a random-control experiment is conducted. It is only fair to point out, however, that for the program to demonstrate a statistically significant effect on the 1969-1972 sample, this unknown set of factors must be sufficiently powerful to almost double the predicted recidivism rate.

### *The Question of Differential Impact*

A number of recent commentators have stressed the fact that programs are not "black boxes," to be tested solely in terms of output, but rather are intervention strategies based, to one degree or another, on theoretical assumptions.<sup>34</sup> Thus, the more

<sup>33</sup>To double check, we considered the effect of these variables within our Brooke House sample on "recidivism effectiveness," i.e., after factoring out the base expectancy ratings. Very small relationships without consistent direction were found on military experience (negative relationship), job stability (positive), and absence of drug use (positive). Taken together, their effect on the recidivism rate is negligible.

<sup>34</sup>Glaser, *Remedies for the Key Deficiency in Criminal Justice Evaluation Research*, 11 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 144 (1974); Glaser, *Achieving Better Questions: A Half Century's Progress in Correctional Research*, FED. PROBATION at 3 (Sept. 1975); Palmer, *Martinson Revisited*, 12 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 133 (1975).



important question to be answered is held to be: can we learn from this program whether this modality is particularly appropriate for any particular kind of client? (What we have really been asking so far has been, in effect, a variation of that question: is there any evidence that this program is effective with the kinds of clients with whom the parole board wants it to be effective?)

As noted earlier, there are a number of background factors which are related to lower recidivism rates among Brooke House clients, at least in part because they are related to the likelihood of program completion. The question remains whether this relationship was a special characteristic of the program modality or a general one for the releasee population. After factoring in the base expectancy scores the "net program impacts" for sets of background characteristics can be estimated, and such a comparison was made for both the 1965-1968 and 1969-1972 groups. Several variables did show statistically significant effects, although in no case was the correlational relationship particularly powerful. When the 1965-1968 group was sorted through, for example, positive net impacts were shown for clients who did not come from Boston, who were not presently incarcerated as the result of a parole violation, who had low educational achievement, and who had no co-defendants at their current trial.

While these characteristics would make sense in terms of the program focus, it must be recognized that "data dredging" of this sort *ought* to turn up *some* "statistically significant" relationships as an artifact of the statistical method. Moreover, *none* of these variables was significantly associated with positive program impact within the 1969-1972 client group. This latter fact strongly suggests that some of the selective impact that we might have felt called upon to "discover" for the program, had this study been limited to the first client group, would have been little more than a minor statistical illusion.

This raises, of course, an unfortunate point which must be weighed against the emerging *post hoc* reinterpretation of correctional program research. The scientific method calls upon the researcher to make his predictions *before* assessing his data, and to design his research to test the hypotheses he has already set. If this research had stopped with the 1965-1968 clients, it would have been easy enough to look at the results, to "discover" groups within which there was a statistically significant effect, and to claim that the program had a positive effect on each observed effect.

While this is a perfectly acceptable technique for generating *new* hypotheses to be *tested*, it is not a particularly appropriate model for "validating" theory. The reviewer who feels that this argument is unfair might ask himself how difficult it would be to "reconcile" other relationships which were not found, or even the *obverse* of the relationships which were found. The recent review of the correctional program literature by Professor Glaser does a masterful job of reconciling the partial effects found in a variety of research attempts.<sup>35</sup> But the bulk of the studies covered were not planned to test those effects directly, and few ever went on to repeat the research process with such new hypotheses in focus.

The two-phase structure of the present research allowed us to test those "emerging generalizations" hinted at in the 1965-1968 research, and the negative results of those tests forced us to recognize that such generalizations can prove illusory, transitory, or both. Thus chastened, we report here only one of the "impact factors" found for the 1969-1972 sample and only because it has critical implications for the Brooke House program. It was clear that those who had records of involvement with narcotics did substantially worse than their base expectancy scores would predict. It is also clear that an increasing proportion of Brooke House clients have such records. The program's administrators have been aware of these trends during recent years, and have taken steps to adapt the program to those with drug problems without surrendering the basic approach of reality therapy. They have not responded, as some programs might have, by avoiding those with drug records.

It is not clear whether these adaptations will be effective in reducing recidivism. But it is clear that the program's aggressive response to the challenge of dealing with drug offenders in a program that is *not* drug-abuse centered has met with favorable reaction among those evaluating Brooke House and its place in the Massachusetts correctional process.<sup>36</sup>

### Conclusion

Even after all the appropriate methodological fallbacks are explored, the evidence on Brooke House discloses no net impact for the program in terms of reducing recidivism. This is consistent with other research on residential programs, whether pre-

<sup>35</sup> See authorities cited in note 34 *supra*.

<sup>36</sup> Ohlin & Janvier, *Report of the Massachusetts Adult Correction and Parole Project* (Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice, October 1975).

release, parole, or referral, whatever the program modality employed.

This does not mean that *some* programs may not help *some* people. But it does seem to imply that the *general* utility of such programs as a tool in crime reduction is minimal, given the limits of present knowledge about instigating behavior change. The case of Brooke House demonstrates that this is probably true even where the program is stable, the house well-run, and the staff well-trained.

Of course, the promise of an effect upon the recidivism rate is by no means the only ground on which halfway houses can be justified. Proponents of St. Joseph's House, for example, may properly respond that from their perspective:

The success or failure of the Pittsburgh halfway house, or, for that matter, any halfway house, cannot be measured by counting the number of men who have returned to prison as compared to the number who have gone "straight." In evaluating any such program, due regard should be taken of the number of men who have had an opportunity which would otherwise have been denied, of leaving prison under the aegis of such a program.<sup>37</sup>

Those who make such an argument can certainly use the Brooke House experience to support their case. Whatever the basis for their decision, it remains clear that the Massachusetts Parole Board was unwilling to release these 245 men without a conditional placement.

The comparison of Brooke House clients to the general sample of those released from Massachusetts correctional institutions in 1971 indicated that the Parole Board requiring the placement seemed to be responding primarily to inferences about the inmate's social background and to the character of his present offense. Thus the Brooke House client was more likely to have been committed for a sex-related offense (eleven per cent versus six per cent for the total 1971 releasee group) or for a robbery involving a weapon (twenty-eight per cent versus twenty-one per cent for the 1971 releasee group).

Neither of these offender categories is linked to high recidivism by Department of Corrections researchers. Recidivism rates of twenty-one per cent (armed robbery) and eight per cent (sex-related offenses) are clearly below the twenty-five per cent recidivism rate for all 1971 releasees.<sup>38</sup> But clearly

these *are* categories of offenses which particularly offend and unnerve the public, including Parole Board members. Placement of such offenders at a halfway house allows the Board, the agency responsible for the *safe* release of offenders, to offer parole without feeling that it has relinquished control.

It is in such an organizational context that a crucial "effect" for the House can be pinpointed: *Brooke House provided an avenue by which men who would otherwise not then gain release from prison could do so, and men released through Brooke House did not return to prison with any greater frequency than those who obtained direct release.*

Moreover, the rationale for community facilities as a pre-release tool is somewhat different than that for parole. Indeed, some correctional administrators would argue that so long as the results on recidivism are no worse, community corrections are to be preferred to incarceration. Since these administrators hesitate to approach their legislatures or the press with what is at bottom a humanitarian argument, the rationale becomes a cost-efficiency claim.<sup>39</sup>

Other correctional administrators approach the cost benefit possibilities from a rather different perspective, recognizing that the use of community facilities may allow both short and long term extension of the incarceration network. Such extensions are critical organizational resources at a time when prisons are overcrowded, but public pressure for more extensive use of imprisonment is accelerating.

As Norman Carlson noted in a recent speech on prison capacities:

We may be able to lighten the burden on jail and prison facilities to some extent by an increased use of community-based corrections, such as probation, parole, halfway houses and other programs designed to keep some offenders under supervision without incarcerating them in traditional correctional institutions.<sup>40</sup>

The research here reported upon contributes to arguments against correctional strategies which sur-

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*rectional Institutions During 1971* (Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, May 1975). That study defines recidivism as reimprisonment for a period to be at least six months, and used a follow-up period of one year.

<sup>39</sup>Such a public rationale may eventually work against community corrections, however, since the evidence on cost is ambiguous at best.

<sup>40</sup>Quoted in Orr Kelly, *Prison Overflow Predicted*. Washington Star, October 29, 1975. This also appears to be the hidden premise of arguments for the incarceration of greater numbers of offenders. See J. Q. WILSON, *THINKING ABOUT CRIME* (1975).

round the decision to release an inmate with a series of special “conditions” like residence at a halfway facility. The “new view” provides a strategy for obtaining partial control over defendants who, because of system logistics and sentencing practices,

are not now incarcerated. It does not seem unfair to insist that this new version of community corrections should receive similarly strict scrutiny of its political, as well as its bureaucratic, bases.



8621 Gail Avenue



8619 Gail Avenue





8615 Gail Avenue



8611 Gail Avenue





8609 Gail Avenue



8610 Gail Avenue





8614 Gail Avenue



8616 Gail Avenue





8618 Gail Avenue



3200 Malissa Avenue





3204 Malissa Avenue



2839 Malissa Avenue





8602 Marilyn Avenue



8606 Marilyn Avenue





8608 Marilyn Avenue




8610 Marilyn Avenue





8612 Marilyn Avenue



8620 Marilyn Avenue





8617 Marilyn Avenue



8613 Marilyn Avenue





8609 Marilyn Avenue



8607 Marilyn Avenue





8605 Marilyn Avenue



8601 Marilyn Avenue





8597 Marilyn Avenue



8595 Marilyn Avenue



TTNA EXHIBIT 31  
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## Sam Sanbei

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**From:** Hal Hart  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:32 PM  
**To:** Rob Steedle  
**Cc:** Travis Goddard  
**Subject:** RE: Haven House meeting

Rob:

She told us it was the worst experience in her career. We (Ben, Beth and I) were talking as a team about how to handle situations like these "hot rooms" in the future and that they take on certain qualities. To an extent we can diffuse conflict situations through training i.e. working with various techniques to control the direction, flow, discussion, approach, even the set-up of a room can help to enforce/keep civility in place. We may consider looking at a training class since none of Planner 1, 2's probably have had this training and thankfully this negative of an experience while for others their training may have been back in the 1990s (Beth).

Thanks.

Hal Hart AICP  
Director, Community Development Department  
City and Borough of Juneau  
*Alaska's Capital City*

(907) 586-0757

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**From:** Rob Steedle  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 28, 2014 1:06 PM  
**To:** Hal Hart  
**Cc:** Travis Goddard  
**Subject:** RE: Haven House meeting

Yes, we talked. It was awful.

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**From:** Hal Hart  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 28, 2014 11:34 AM  
**To:** Rob Steedle  
**Cc:** Travis Goddard  
**Subject:** FW: Haven House meeting

There was a rough crowd last night. Here is the live email I got during the Planning Commission (my phone was off)....from our newspaper reporter. This morning Beth reported it was the worst meeting she had attended in 19 years. I will be doing something nice for her today.

Hal Hart AICP  
Director, Community Development Department  
City and Borough of Juneau  
*Alaska's Capital City*

(907) 586-0757